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Mediation and the Transformation of 
American Labor Unions 
Ann C. Hodges" 
The decline of unionization in the United States is a phenomenon that has 
been well-documented. The shift in workplace regulation from collectivization 
to individual regulation has been suggested as both a cause and an effect of the 
reduction in unionization. 1 This transformation from a collective contractual to 
a more individual statutory regime is now undergoing another change-a return 
to contractual or privatized regulation, not through unions or collective 
bargaining but through alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") oflegal claims. 
Scholars observing this phenomenon have bemoaned the decrease in 
unionization, because of the loss of power and the loss of voice for working 
Americans. Many thoughtful proposals for changes that would revitalize the 
labor movement have resulted. Suggestions range from changes in the law to 
changes in the structure and approaches of unions. Among the more prevalent 
recommendations for legal change are more effective remedies for violations of 
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), mandatory arbitration of first 
collective bargaining agreements, removal of restrictions on employer-initiated 
or dominated employee organizations, and permitting recognition of, and 
bargaining with, nonmajority unions. Other scholars have focused on changes 
in union orientation and structure. Among the recommendations are providing 
services to members who are not represented for collective bargaining, moving 
to occupationally-based unions with a focus on professionalization and training 
for the new workplace, emphasizing employee skill development rather than 
career employment with one employer, and increasing collaboration with other 
groups focusing on social justice. 
Another branch of scholarly research has focused on the trend toward 
privatization through ADR. While a large group of scholars commends the 
move as creating a positive alternative to litigation by allowing interest-based 
problem solving and quicker, cheaper resolution of disputes, another group 
focuses on the loss of legal rights and power resulting from compulsory ADR. 
Employees forced to arbitrate legal claims may lose remedies, the right to a jury 
trial, and the right to consolidate claims in class actions. Arbitration may, in fact, 
be more costly than litigation for some employees. Another concern vocalized 
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about the more informal dispute resolution of ADR is the potential for 
disadvantage to less powerful groups. In response to this concern, scholars have 
recently suggested the use of employee caucuses and outside social justice 
organizations to represent employees in dispute resolution forums. 
In a recent article, Professor Marion Crain and Ken Matheny suggest that 
unions should focus not only on economic justice but also on social justice, 
eliminating the artificial divide between the two.2 To enhance this focus in the 
changing workplace, Crain and Matheny urge changing the law to impose on 
unions an affirmative duty to battle discrimination and allowing unions to 
negotiate arbitration provisions that waive employee rights to litigate 
discrimination claims.3 They suggest that the combination of these changes 
would broaden the identity of labor unions as social justice organizations.4 
This Article urges an incremental step toward the goal of trade union 
revitalization which incorporates the benefits of expanded identity and enhanced 
dispute resolution. Unions should negotiate provisions in collective bargaining 
agreements that offer mediation as an option for claims not covered by the 
agreement,5 including legal claims and other disputes such as interpersonal 
conflicts or communication difficulties. Such provisions would enable unions 
to make progress toward many of the goals suggested by other scholars, while 
at the same time providing a voluntary option for dispute resolution that bestows 
some advantages on employers, employees and unions and offers promise for 
reducing the power differentials between employees and employers involved in 
legal disputes. 
First, the Article analyzes in more detail the changes in the workplace that 
have led to various proposals for reform. Then the Article looks at the potential 
for mediation of claims that do not arise out of the collective bargaining 
agreement, analyzing the possible benefits from the point of view of employers, 
employees and unions. Next, some of the issues and obstacles to mediation are 
reviewed. Ultimately the Article concludes that the benefits of mediation 
outweigh the disadvantages and that in most collective bargaining relationships 
the obstacles should not prevent either negotiation of such provisions or their 
successful use for at least some cases. 
2. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767 
(2001). 
3. Id. at 1839-45. 
4. Id. at 1846. 
5. Some unions and employers have negotiated provisions for mediation of 
grievances arising under the collective bargaining agreement. See Peter Feuille, 
Grievance Mediation, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN 
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 187, 190-92 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 
1999) (documenting the use of grievance mediation). 
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I. THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 
A. The Decline of Unionization 
The changes in the workplace and in regulation of the workplace have been 
documented convincingly by scholars and commentators. Unionization of the 
workplace has declined from a high of thirty-five percent in 1954 to 12.9 percent 
today.6 The decline has been attributed to a multiplicity of factors including 
globalization and the consequent relocation of many industries, the related 
transition from an industry-based economy to a service-based economy, 
employers' increasingly active opposition to unionization and the ineffectiveness 
of legal regulation of employer anti-union tactics, and the changing 
demographics of the workforce.7 While some scholars view the reduction in 
unionization with factual agnosticism, others have sounded alarms, suggesting 
that the result is despotic corporate power, loss of a vehicle for democratic 
training, and loss of voice for workers, leading to disenchantment and reduced 
productivity.8 Freeman and Rogers have documented the representation gap 
between the much larger percentage of workers who desire a workplace 
representative and the very small percentage who have it.9 Moreover, as the 
unionization level has decreased, the number of employees protected from unjust 
discharge by union contracts has decreased, leaving more employees vulnerable 
to termination at will. 
6. See Press Release, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Union Members in 2003 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/rofod/3280.pdf; see also Charles B. Craver, The Clinton Labor 
Board: Continuing a Tradition of Moderation and Excellence, 16 LAB. LAW. 123, 148 
(2000). 
7. For discussions of union decline and the factors contributing thereto, see, for 
example, CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF THE 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 34-55 ( 1993); GOULD, supra note 1, at 35-61; Katherine 
Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual 
Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
575, 579-81 (1992). 
8. See, e.g., CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 251-52 (1996); Charles B. Craver, The 
National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 
ARIZ. L. REV. 397,401-02(1992);Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' 
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1822-27 {1983). 
9. See RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WORKER REPRESENTATION AND 
PARTICIPATION SURVEY: FIRST REPORT OF FINDINGS (1994). 
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B. The Move to Individual Rights 
Along with the decline of unions, however, has come the increasing 
regulation of the workplace through laws providing individual rights. 10 
Antidiscrimination laws have developed increasing significance, beginning with 
the Equal Pay Act' 1 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 continuing 
with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 13 and most recently the 
Americans with Disabilities Act14 and the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 15 Other federal 
laws have provided individual rights to employees, including the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") in 1970,16 the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act ("ERISA") in 1974,17 the Employee Polygraph Protection Act 
("EPPA") in 1988,18 the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act 
("WARN") in 1988, 19 the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") in 1993,20 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIP AA") in 
1996.21 In addition to the growth of federal statutory law, common law 
exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will at the state level have increased 
exponentially in recent years. The lack of protection by union contract has led 
workers to challenge terminations perceived as unjust through legal action. The 
overwhelming majority of states have recognized a common law cause of action 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.22 Most states have also 
10. See GOULD, supra note I, at 55-58; James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group 
Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1563, 1571-72 (1996) 
(documenting the shift in Congress's regulatory focus from collective action to individual 
rights). 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000). 
12. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-e-17 (2000). 
13. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-634 (2000). 
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 2001). 
15. Pub L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified in scattered Sections of2 U.S.C., 
16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (Supp. 2001). 
17. Id.§§ 1001-1461. 
18. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2001-2009 (2000). 
19. Id. §§ 2101-2109. 
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. 2001). 
21. Pub. L. No. I 04-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered Sections 
ofl8 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and42 U.S.C.). There has also been a resurgence in 
claims under some older federal statutes including the Fair Labor Standards Act 
("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000), enacted in 1938. See Attorneys Discuss 
Strategies for Bringing, Defending FLSA Collective Action Lawsuits, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 156, at C-1 (Aug. 13, 2002). 
22. See Employment at Will: State Rulings Chart, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep (BNA) (Indiv. 
Emp. Rts. Man.), at 505:51-52 (Jan. 20, 2004) (showing that forty-four states and the 
District of Columbia have recognized the claim for wrongful discharge in violation of 
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allowed employees to sue for breach of implied contracts with their employers. 23 
Employees have also used the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to combat 
terminations.24 Additionally, various other common law causes of action have 
been increasingly used in the employment setting, including defamation, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and tortious 
interference with contract. Montana passed the only statute expressly requiring 
cause for termination25 and many other states have enacted statutes protecting 
individual employee rights.26 
Employment and labor litigation has ballooned to a significant percentage 
of the federal court docket27 and has also substantially increased in many state 
courts. Employers bemoan the numerous and often overlapping legal claims 
available to employees, particularly those with potential for large jury awards. 
One employer response has been to move toward ADR.28 Internal dispute 
public policy). 
23. Id. (showing that forty-five states and the District of Columbia have recognized 
implied contract claims). 
24. See, e.g., Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 782 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Alaska 
1989); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 374 (Cal. 1988); see also 
Employment at Will, supra note 22, at 505:51-52 (showing that eleven states have 
recognized the claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
25. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 39-2-904 (2001). 
26. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 44-201 (Michie 1997) (prohibiting an employer from 
maintaining a black list containing names of employees for the purposes of preventing 
them from obtaining employment); KY.REV. STAT.ANN.§ 351.127 (Michie Supp. 2002) 
(requiring an emergency medical technician on site at every coal mine "engaged in the 
extraction, production, or preparation of coal"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1518, § 3A 
(West Supp. 2003) (requiring employers to adopt sexual harassment policies and 
encouraging employers to conduct education and training sessions concerning sexual 
harassment); MINN. STAT.§ 181.941 (1993) (requiring employers with twenty-one or 
more employees to provide up to six weeks of unpaid leave to new parents following 
birth or adoption); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-12 (West 2002) (making it unlawful for an 
employer to discriminate against prospective employees on the basis of their genetic 
information or refusal to submit to genetic testing); N.Y. LAB. LAW§ 212 (McKinney 
2002) (requiring growers and processors to provide safe and accessible drinking water 
at all sites where farm laborers are working); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-51.4:5 (Michie 
2002) (providing immunity to workers who report threatening workplace conduct). 
27. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Tables 8-7 (courts of appeals) and C-2 
(district courts) (Mar. 31, 2002) (showing 36,979 labor and employment cases out of 
265,091 total civil cases in the federal district courts, about fourteen percent of the 
caseload and 4,224 labor and employment cases out of 35,732 total civil cases in the 
courts of appeals, about 11.8 percent of the caseload), athttp://www.uscourts.gov/case 
load2002/contents.htrnl. 
28. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies, 
and the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
375, 387 (2003) (finding based on empirical research in telecommunications industry that 
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resolution mechanisms range from open door policies for any issue to mandatory 
arbitration of legal claims. While many scholars applaud the move to ADR as 
beneficial because of its focus on quicker, cheaper and frequently interest-based 
solutions, others complain that employees are deprived of legal rights by 
employers who compel them to participate in fora without the judicial 
protections otherwise available. 
Much of the criticism of ADR has been directed at mandatory arbitration 
of legal claims. As Professor Malin has ably pointed out, the crux of the 
criticism is that compulsory arbitration permits employers to contract out of 
statutory compliance unilaterally.29 Unlike voluntary post-dispute arbitration, 
employees don't actually bargain for predispute arbitration systems imposed by 
the employer.Jo Employers can structure the systems to shorten limitations 
periods, limit remedies, avoid juries, restrict discovery, preclude employee 
representation, impose substantial arbitral cost on the employee, or require use 
of a non-neutral arbitrator.J1 Even where the arbitrator is jointly chosen by the 
parties, the repeat player effect might result in arbitral decisions more favorable 
to the employer. J2 These concerns have led to widespread criticism of mandatory 
arbitration.33 Despite the criticism, employers continue to adopt arbitration 
litigation threats are associated with the adoption of arbitration for nonunion employees 
but not with adoption of peer review procedures, which are prompted by threat of 
unionization). 
29. Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But by How Much? Questions Gilmer 
Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO Sr. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 592 (2001). 
30. Id. at 596-97. 
31. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When ls Cost an Unlawful Barrier to 
Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment 
Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 143 (2002); Malin, supra note 29, at 598-99. 
32. Malin, supra note 29, at 603-05. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employment 
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE Rrs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997) 
[hereinafter Bingham, Employment Arbitration]; Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, 
Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment 
Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998). 
33. For criticisms of mandatory arbitration see, for example, Sarah Rudolph Cole, 
Incentives & Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration 
Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996), Joseph 
R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in 
the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996), Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration 
and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395 ( 1999), 
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, Jean 
R. Stem light, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference 
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996), and Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of 
the 1990's, 73 DENY. u. L. REV. 1017 (1996). 
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systems and the Supreme Court has endorsed arbitration of statutory claims.34 
Moreover, the Court's recent ruling that the Federal Arbitration Act encompasses 
employment arbitration has provided a boost to employers desiring to enforce 
arbitration provisions. 35 The litigation focus has shifted from whether the FAA 
applies to employment arbitration to challenges to particular arbitration 
agreements. Employees resisting arbitration argue that the arbitration agreement 
precludes effective enforcement of statutory rights36 or is unenforceable based 
on general contract defenses, such as duress, fraud or unconscionability.37 
Dispute resolution methods other than arbitration have been less 
controversial. Nevertheless, other alternative methods have not been without 
their critics. Settlement by any method may inhibit development of the law and 
34. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (holding 
that a "claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ... [could] be 
subjected to compulsory arbitration ... in a securities registration application"); 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989) 
(finding claims under Securities Act of 1933 arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985) (finding statutory antitrust 
claims arbitrable). 
35. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (interpreting the 
Federal Arbitration Act to apply to all employment contracts except those of 
transportation workers). 
36. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000); 
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(refusing to require arbitration ofTitle VII claims where statutory damages unavailable); 
Cole v. Bums Int') Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (interpreting 
arbitration agreement to require employer to pay all arbitrators' fees in order to uphold 
the agreement; finding that employees cannot be required to pay fees to enforce statutory 
rights in arbitration if such fees would not be required for judicial enforcement). 
37. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 784-87 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding unilaterally imposed arbitration agreement unconscionable where it 
required the employee to pay half of the costs, covered claims that employees are likely 
to bring but excluded those that employers are likely to bring, and contained discovery 
provisions favorable to the employer); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 
687 (1996); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002) (finding unconscionable an arbitration agreement 
imposed as a contract of adhesion which limited plaintiffs statutory remedies); Hendrix 
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. B 153848, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 6598, at *9-10 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding unconscionable and unenforceable arbitration agreement 
that covered claims employees likely to bring but excluded those employers likely to 
bring, required employees to pay half the cost of arbitration after the first hearing day, 
and allowed arbitrator to impose all costs on employees who lose claims). For an 
analysis of unconscionability and arbitration, see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and 
Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1001 (1996). 
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legal norms, particularly where a statute is relatively new.38 Informal dispute 
resolution methods do not contain some of the judicial system's safeguards that 
protect litigants from bias.39 Accordingly, persons with less power, frequently 
men of color and women, may be disadvantaged in informal processes. 40 While 
some scholars have cautioned against use of such processes on this basis,41 others 
have suggested that alternative processes may be well-suited to members of 
disadvantaged groups because of their greater focus on relationships and 
resolution. 42 
C. The Result of Workplace Changes 
These changes in the workplace and the regulation of the workplace have 
caused or exacerbated certain problems. While statutory and common law 
protections have expanded, many employees' ability to access these protections 
is limited. In the unionized workplace, unions provide not only representation 
in contractual disputes, but often representation in legal disputes as well. In the 
nonunion workplace, employees must find legal representation or represent 
themselves. Pro se representation in complex legal disputes is extraordinarily 
difficult. Attorneys are rarely available except to employees with financial 
means, or those with very strong cases that make contingency fee representation 
38. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 671-72 (1986); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 
I 073, 1085-86 (1984); Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 30 (1990); Daniel 
Misteravich, The Limits of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Preserving the Judicial 
Function, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 37, 39-40 (1992). 
39. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of 
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1367-75. 
40. See id. at 1390-99; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Danger 
for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1600-07 (1991); see also Margaret F. Brinig, Does 
Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 
( 1995) (reviewing empirical evidence and suggesting that any disadvantage comes from 
power differential rather than characteristics such as altruism and risk aversion, which 
some suggest are associated with gender). 
41. See Delgado et al., supra note 39, at 1387-91; Grillo, supra note 40, at 1607-
10. 
42. See generally Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling 
Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 55; Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 338, 370-76 (1990). 
See also Deborah M. Kolb & Linda L. Putnam, Through the Looking Glass: Negotiation 
Theory Refracted Through the Lens of Gender, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
DIRECTIONS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 231, 231-57 (Sandra E. Gleason ed., 
1997); Kate McCabe, Comment, A Forum/or Women's Voices: Mediation Through A 
Feminist Jurisprudential Lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 459 (2001). 
2004) UNIONS AND MEDIATION 373 
financially feasible.43 While attorneys' fees are awarded under many statutes 
when the employee prevails, a lawyer will be willing to risk representation only 
in a case that appears very strong.44 While some statutes hold potential for 
representation by a government agency, the overworked, underfunded agencies 
accept a limited number of cases for litigation.45 Accordingly, many employees 
simply lack the means to enforce their statutory rights. 
As set forth above, many employers have responded to the proliferation of 
legal rights by mandating use of ADR. Most of the same representational 
concerns are present. While some have suggested that arbitration may provide 
a low cost alternative for employees to enforce their rights,46 there has yet to 
develop a legal bar or other source of relatively low cost representation for 
employees in the alternative forum. Indeed, the plaintiffs' bar has been a strong 
opponent of arbitration, fearing a move to an unlevel playing field with limited 
remedies and attorneys' fees.47 Evidence suggests that where one party has an 
attorney and the other does not, the party with the attorney is more likely to 
prevail.48 Moreover, despite its reputation as a less expensive forum, arbitration 
43. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 
30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 58 (1998). 
44. Id. 
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(c), (f) (2000) (establishing the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") duty to investigate charges and file litigation 
where necessary). In 2001 the EEOC filed 430 lawsuits alleging employment 
discrimination in violation of statutes such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Equal Pay Act of 
1963. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Litigation 
Statistics, FY 1992 to FY 2001, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last 
modified Feb. 6, 2003). 
46. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturnsfor Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 
562-63 (2001) (arguing that most employees will be better off in arbitration); Theodore 
J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 91-93 (200 I) 
(suggesting that arbitration with appropriate protections for employees may be "the most 
realistic hope of the ordinary blue-or pink-collar claimant"). 
47. See Brief for National Employment Lawyers Association, EEOC v. Waffle 
House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (No. 99-1823); Brief for National Employment Lawyers 
Association, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379); 
Brief for National Employment Lawyers Association, Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235); Cliff Palefsky, The Civil Rights Struggle 
of the '90s: From 'Separate but Equal' to 'Just Another Forum', THE RECORDER, May 
1999, at S35. 
48. Data demonstrates that employees who are represented in unemployment 
compensation proceedings are more likely to be awarded benefits. Rick McHugh, Lay 
Representation in Unemployment Insurance Hearings: Some Strategies for Change, 16 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 865, 866 (1983) (citing the 1979 study by National Commission 
on Unemployment Compensation). Where employers used attorneys and employees had 
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can actually cost more than litigation because the arbitrator charges fees while 
the judge does not.49 
The decline of unionization has weakened the labor movement as a whole. 
While there is debate about the cause and effect relationship, there is no doubt 
that the labor movement is less powerful than in the past when more of the 
workforce was unionized. If a union cannot organize all of the major employers 
in an industry, it is difficult to sustain high wages and benefits for unionized 
employees. In addition, the unions' political power is reduced because they have 
less money and fewer voting members. It has been many years since unions have 
been able to obtain any significant legislative victories which directly affect 
unions, in contrast to the workforce in general. 50 The strike, long thought to be 
no representation, the employees' success rate in obtaining unemployment compensation 
was thirty percent, but where both parties were represented the employees' success rate 
improved to fifty percent. Ann C. Hodges, The Preclusive Effect of Unemployment 
Compensation Determinations in Subsequent Litigation: A Federal Solution, 38 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1803, 1830 n.138 (l 992)(citing a 1979 study). In a study of discharge cases in 
arbitration, Block and Stieber found that where one party was represented by an attorney 
and the other was not, the party with legal representation had a greater chance of 
prevailing, but the odds of prevailing were the same where either both or neither were 
represented. See Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and 
Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543, 548, 553 (1987). 
Some employment arbitration systems provide that if the employee foregoes legal 
representation, the employer will do so as well. JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, 
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 83 (1997) (describing 
arbitration policies of The Travelers Group and Brown & Root). Others fund some 
portion of the employee's legal fees. Id. (describing arbitration policies of Brown & 
Root and ITI). Such features offer employees greater potential for access to justice. 
49. See LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 31, at 164-65 (noting that arbitration costs can 
be higher than the cost of litigation in some cases, but also pointing out that the forum 
and arbitrator fees may be balanced by other costs that are relatively cheaper in 
arbitration). The lower cost often comes from more limited discovery, which may 
disadvantage employees who have Jess access to information than the employer, and the 
decision not to use legal representation, write briefs or transcribe the proceedings. Id. at 
162. But see Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: 
A Critique of Public Citizen's Jeremaiad on the "Costs of Arbitration", 57 DISP. RESOL. 
J., Jan. 2003, at 8, l 0. 
50. No major amendments to the NLRA have been enacted since 1959. In 1977, 
a major reform effort failed. CRAVER, supra note 7, at 32. Since that time labor has 
achieved no significant legislative victories at the federal level. By way of contrast, 
major employee protection legislation directed at the workforce as a whole has been 
enacted regularly including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 with major 
amendments in 1972 and 1991, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e--e- l 7 (2000); the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act in 1967 with major amendments in 1974, 1978, 1986, and 1991, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101-12213 (2000); the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in 1974 with major 
2004] UNIONS AND MEDIATION 375 
labor's most important weapon, is used sparingly because of the difficulty in 
prevailing and the potential loss of jobs and public support. 51 Labor has searched 
for new tools for organizing employees and putting economic pressure on 
employers, with limited success.52 
The labor movement has long been criticized for its failure to appeal to the 
growing portion of the workforce-people of color, many recent immigrants, and 
amendments in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989 and 1996, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000); the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000); the Family 
and Medical Leave Act in 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000); the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act in 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-gg-2 (2000); the 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act in 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2000); the Older 
Workers Benefit and Protection Act in 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433; and the Worker 
Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act in 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102-2109 (2000). 
While organized labor has been a major supporter of most employee protective 
legislation, such legislation also has broader support from other advocacy groups for 
workers, consumers and retirees including the AARP, the NAACP, the National 
Organization for Women, various disability rights groups, and the National Partnership 
for Women and Families. 
51. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Data, at http://www.bls.gov (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (showing substantial 
decline in both number of work stoppages and number of employees participating in 
work stoppages since 1960). For example, there were more than two hundred work 
stoppages involving one thousand or more employees each year from 1960 to 1979, and 
in some years more than four hundred. See id. In 1980 and 1981 there were more than 
one hundred stoppages and since that time the number has never been greater than one 
hundred. See id. In most years there have been fewer than fifty and in some years as few 
as seventeen or nineteen. See id. Unable to use the strike effectively, many unions have 
gone long periods without a collective bargaining agreement in effect. 
52. See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 928, 928-29, 947-48 (1998) 
(describing "inside game" tactics used by union including refusals to work voluntary 
overtime, working to the rule, and filing of grievances as a group); STEPHEN FRANKLIN, 
THREE STRIKES: LABOR'S HEARTLAND LoSSES AND WHAT THEY MEAN FOR WORKING 
AMERICANS 27-3 7 (200 I)( describing the use of corporate campaigns by labor unions); 
PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW LABOR 
MARKET I 05-19 (describing new organizing efforts in the telecommunications industry, 
for professional and managerial employees and for low income and contingent workers); 
Crain & Matheny, supra note 2, at 1785 (describing the AFL-CIO's new emphasis on 
organizing); Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons 
from Three Rounds of Negotiations, 40 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 543 (2002) (describing the 
Justice for Janitors campaign which successfully organized janitorial workers in Los 
Angeles office buildings using public protests, coalition building, and strategic pressure, 
and has maintained the union through three negotiating cycles); Nathan Newman, Union 
and Community Mobilization in the Information Age, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, Aug. 
2002, at 9, 9-10 (describing the use of the Internet as an organizing tool for widely 
dispersed workers and for publicizing negative information about employers to pressure 
them to recognize unions). 
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white women-many of whom are in service rather than manufacturingjobs.s3 
Some unions have a history of overt discrimination, while others historically 
have made efforts to eliminate discrimination and increase inclusiveness. s4 The 
failure to include these groups as an integral part of the labor movement has been 
cited as a cause for the decline of unions.ss While unions have made some 
efforts to bridge this gap in recent years,s6 the hierarchy of most unions remains 
53. Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex 
Equality & Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1942-46 ( 1994) [hereinafter Crain, Between 
Feminism]; Marion Crain, Critical Race Studies: Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 1313, 1322-23 (2002) [hereinafter Crain, Colorblind]; Marion Crain & Ken 
Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the United Front Ideology, 84 
CoRNELLL.REv.1542, 1594-96 (1999); Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American 
Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 633, 648-49; 
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half Century, 
61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631, 645 (1985). 
54. See Michael J. Goldberg, Affirmative Action in Union Government: The 
Landrum-Griffin Act Implications, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 652-53 ( 1983) (discussing the 
history of discrimination in the labor movement); Steven H. Kropp, Deconstructing 
Racism in American Society-The Role Labor Law Might Have Played (But Did Not) in 
Ending Race Discrimination: A Partial Explanation and Historical Commentary, 23 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 380-85, 398 (2002)(detailing history of discrimination 
by railroad unions against African-Americans but also noting important labor support for 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Lowell Turner & Richard W. Hurd, Building Social 
Movement Unionism: The Transformation of the American Labor Movement, in 
REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR'S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TwENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 15 (Lowell Turner et al. eds., 2001) (noting that although labor supported civil 
rights legislation and some unions were active in the civil rights movement, Hispanic and 
black workers were excluded from many high paying union jobs, often with the support 
ofunions). See generally WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1977) (discussing the history of unions and 
race). 
55. Craver, supra note 53, at 648-49; Ruth Needleman, Comments, in WOMEN AND 
UNIONS: FORGING A PARTNERSHIP 406, 410-11 (Dorothy Sue Cobble ed., 1993) 
(highlighting ways in which "union culture discourages female participation and 
leadership"); St. Antoine, supra note 53, at 645; Stone, supra note 7, at 581. 
56. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 2, at 1784-85, 1829-30 (describing the AFL-
CIO' s recent initiatives to appeal to women, people of color and immigrant workers and 
to focus on social justice); Ruth Milkman & Kent Wong, Organizing Immigrant 
Workers: Case Studies from Southern California, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT,supra 
note 54, at 99-128 (describing and analyzing successful and unsuccessful efforts to 
organize immigrant workers); Stone, supra note 7, at 581-82 (arguing that unions have 
appealed to women and people of color). 
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predominantly white and male. 57 For most unions, the attempt to become more 
inclusive has been sporadic and tentative. 
D. Proposals for Change 
Proposals to address the above-identified problems abound. 58 Among the 
early proposals were changes in the National Labor Relations Act to make 
remedies for anti-union conduct more effective and union representation easier 
to obtain. 59 Comparisons with Canadian law, which is more protective of 
57. GOULD, supra note 54, at 16 (noting the relative absence of African-Americans 
from policymaking positions in unions); Crain, Between Feminism, supra note 53, at 
1944 (noting the underrepresentation of women in leadership and organizing positions, 
even in unions where women predominate); Goldberg, supra note 54, at 653-55 (citing 
under-representation of women and people of color in union leadership positions); Lois 
S. Gray, The Route to the Top: Female Union Leaders and Union Policy, in WOMEN 
AND UNIONS, supra note 55, at 378-93 (Dorothy Sue Cobble ed., 1993) (noting the 
relative lack of women in the top leadership of unions and analyzing reasons therefore). 
58. Of course, not every observer or scholar views all of the changes as 
problematic. Some perceive the reduction of unionization as beneficial to the economy 
and others see the increase in individual rights as advantageous to workers. See, e.g., 
BARRY T. HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS: NEW 
APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE 211-15 (1986) (concluding that unionization decreases 
profitability, which is likely to impact negatively on investment behavior and long-run 
economic performance); MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER: THE COST 
OF LABOR LAW 192-94 (l 987)(arguing that privileged treatment ofunions, especially the 
rule of exclusive representation, hurts workers by taking away their freedom to "search 
out the highest bidder for their labor services"); Charles Fried, Individual and Collective 
Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and its 
Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1027-29 (l984)(questioning whether the high price 
individuals must pay in order to unionize, in terms of money and loss of freedom, is 
worth any benefits that might arise from unionization); John A. Litwinski, Regulation of 
Labor Market Monopsony, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 86-92 (200 l )(arguing that 
unions create economic inefficiencies and harm consumers). Others see the move toward 
ADR in lieu of litigation as a positive trend. Raymond J. Broderick, Court-Annexed 
Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 JUDICATURE 217 (l 989) (arguing that success of 
court-annexed ADR programs suggests enlarging and expanding the practice); Warren 
E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982) (arguing that arbitration 
should be utilized to complement courts); Carol J. King, Are Justice and Harmony 
Mutually Exclusive? A Response to Professor Nadar, l 0 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 65 
(l 994) (responding to critique of mediation); Judge Dorothy Wright Nelson, ADR in the 
Federal Courts-One Judge's Perspective: Issues and Challenges Facing Judges, 
Lawyers, Court Administrators, and the Public, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. l (200 l ). 
59. See, e.g., CRAVER, supra note 7, at 152-53 (proposing that the National Labor 
Relations Act be amended to provide for immediate reinstatement of illegally terminated 
union supporters, to allow the NLRB to order an employer to bargain with the union 
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employee and union rights in a similar economy with a much higher unionization 
rate, supported many of the proposals for change.60 There followed other 
recommendations for changes in the law. Some commentators urged elimination 
or restriction of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which outlaws company unions, 
to allow additional opportunities for employee voice through organizations 
created or influenced by the employer.61 This recommendation frequently was 
accompanied by suggestions that the German system of W arks Councils be 
adopted in the United States, providing another vehicle for employee voice in 
employer decision-making. 62 Others contended that a narrower exclusion for 
which was unlawfully prevented from gaining majority support by egregious employer 
unfair labor practices, and to provide "make-whole relief' to employees where the 
employer unjustifiably refused to bargain with the union); GOULD, supra note l, at 151-
80 (suggesting, among other amendments, adoption of measures to shorten the delay in 
resolution of unfair labor practice proceedings, double or triple back pay awards to 
employees unfairly discharged, and "first-contract" arbitration as a solution to the erosion 
of support during the union-employer bargaining process); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING 
THE WORKPLACE: THE FuTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 243-52 (1990) 
(recommending accelerating the process of reinstating workers illegally discharged 
during a union representation contest by providing interimjudiciaryreliefpending a final 
verdict); see also Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Special Supp. No. 6 (Jan. 10, 
1995) [hereinafter Dunlop Commission Report]. President Clinton appointed the 
Commission to consider and make recommendations designed to "build more cooperative 
and productive workplace relations." Id. at 10. The Commission recommended, inter 
alia, expedited union representation elections, injunctive actions to remedy discriminatory 
discharges occurring during organizing campaigns and negotiations for first contracts, 
and dispute resolution systems to assist unions and employers in achieving first contracts. 
Id. at 12-13. 
60. Weiler, supra note 8, at 1805-06 (explaining that Canadian unions have the 
right to bargain for employees once a majority of employees have signed authorization 
cards). 
61. See Dunlop Commission Report, supra note 59, at 25 (urging both revision to, 
and interpretation of, Section 8(a)(2) to render lawful nonunion employee participation 
programs if discussion of terms and conditions of work is incidental to the purpose of the 
program); Craver, supra note 8, at 430-31 (recommending interpretation of Section 
8(a)(2) to permit employee participation programs not designed to deprive employees of 
union representation rights); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: 
Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 86-87 
( 1993) (urging that Section 8(a)(2) be interpreted to restrain employee participation in the 
nonunion workplace only where an organizing campaign is ongoing or has occurred 
within the prior two years). But see Michael C. Harper, A Framework for the 
Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. L.J. 103, 110-15 (2001) 
(expressing skepticism about the adverse impact of Section 8(a)(2) on opportunities for 
employee voice). 
62. See WEILER, supra note 59, at 283-95. 
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supervisors and managers would provide more employees with the opportunity 
to unionize. 63 Still others advocated that nonmajority unions seek to bargain for 
their members, with or without a change in the law to eliminate the requirement 
of majority representation. 64 Professor Finkin has suggested that state law might 
be used to fill the representation gap. 65 Professor Harper has offered a creative 
proposal for two-tier representation, a modification of the German Works 
Council system with the two levels of union representation differing in both 
scope of the bargaining unit and negotiating authority.66 Professor Stone has 
suggested a number of changes in the NLRA that would make the statute more 
relevant to the changing workplace, including allowing bargaining units to be 
determined by employee desires rather than rigid employer boundaries, allowing 
peaceful secondary boycotts and closed shops, broadening the definition of 
"employee," and requiring multi-employer bargaining when sought by the 
union. 67 Many of these proposals are thoughtful and worthwhile suggestions that 
might accomplish some, ifnot all, of their intended objectives. Yet the prospect 
for legal change more supportive of unionization is dim.68 
Professors Gottesman and Estreicher have suggested that unions might 
become service providers to employees without majority representation, offering 
63. See GOULD, supra note 1, at 141-42; Dunlop Commission Report, supra note 
59, at 27-28. 
64. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1616-24; Matthew W. Finkin, The 
Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee Representation, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 195 ( 1993 ); Alan Hyde et al., After Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions 
that Represent Less than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 637 (1993); George Schatzki, 
Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: 
Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897 ( 1975); Clyde Summer, Unions 
Without Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.-l<ENT L. REV. 531 (1990). 
65. Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the "Representation Gap'', 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 391, 408-19 (2001) (suggesting that states could legislate representational and 
employee participation requirements short of exclusive bargaining). 
66. Harper, supra note 61, at 124-27. Under this proposal, first tier representatives 
would be chosen by a majority of employees at a single employer by either a card check 
or a representation election in which the employer could not participate. Id. at 124-25. 
First tier representatives could negotiate agreements with just cause protection for 
discipline and grievance and arbitration procedures, and could help enforce external laws, 
but could not negotiate economic terms or use economic pressure such as strikes. Id. 
Second tier representatives, which would have the authority to negotiate economic terms 
and strike after an employee authorization vote, would be selected in broader bargaining 
units, including those with existing first tier representatives. Id. at 126. 
67. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employee Representation in the Boundaryless 
Workplace, 77 CHI.-KENTL.REv. 773, 816-18 (2002). 
68. For an interesting discussion of the source of many current problems with the 
NLRA and the prospects for legal change, see Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of 
American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv.1527 (2002). 
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to employee/members bargaining expertise on complex issues such as pensions 
and insurance, and enabling them to negotiate for collective goods. 69 Under this 
proposal, unions would represent employees (or provide lawyers for employees) 
in contractual negotiations or in cases ranging from discrimination claims to 
wrongful discharge lawsuits to claims for family or medical leave. 70 One focus 
of these proposals has been representation of employees in dispute resolution 
systems imposed by nonunion employers.71 This provision of services may 
increase the power of unions and perhaps allow them to grow into majority 
representation. 72 
Because of the changes in the workplace from a career-employment model 
based on internal labor markets to one where employees move more frequently 
among employers and are urged to structure their own careers, scholars have 
recommended changes in union structure to represent employees more 
effectively in such labor markets.73 Union organization on a multi-employer 
69. Gottesman, supra note 61, at 81-82; Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract 
and labor law Reform: Opening up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 833-34 (1996). 
70. Robert Rabin recognized early the possibility of an expanded role for unions 
in enforcing public rights of employees who were not part of traditional bargaining units. 
See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 169 (1991). 
71. Although scholars initially suggested that there was no legal impediment to 
providing such service where the union is not the majority representative of employees, 
several recent decisions from federal appellate courts have found provision of legal 
services to be an unlawful preelection benefit which warrants setting aside representation 
elections won by unions. See Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 
1999); Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 1995). Although the NLRB 
has not agreed, the decision by the D.C. Circuit, an appeal venue for any Board case, 
makes the Board's retention of its position permitting such assistance futile. Catherine 
L. Fisk, Union lawyers and Employment law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57, 60-61 
(2002). Fisk argues persuasively in favor of the Board's position. Id. 
72. Gottesman, supra note 61, at 81-83. 
73. See, e.g., HECKSCHER,supra note 8, at 155-231 (recommending a new form of 
unionism, more flexible and decentralized, which he denominates "associational 
unionism"); OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 95-129 (discussing various strategies 
for unions facing substantial changes in the workplace); Daniel Cornfield, Labor Union 
Responses to Technological Change: Past Present and Future, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, 
Apr. 1997, at 35, 38 (advocating that unions respond to corporate changes by becoming 
suppliers of labor and establishing union-controlled consulting systems for employees 
facing technological change, which would provide employees with both a knowledge 
base for changing jobs and a job referral network); Charles Heckscher, living with 
Flexibility, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT, supra note 54, at 59, 68-69, 75-78; Stone, 
supra note 67, at 802-03 (discussing union strategies for the boundaryless workplace 
including "new craft unionism," in which unions bargain for minimum standards and 
training and allow individual bargaining above the minimum). 
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occupation or craft basis, like that which exists in the construction industry, 
would permit unions to serve workers by providing training, portable benefits, 
and perhaps even referrals for jobs with unionized employers. 74 Like other 
recommendations for change, union restructuring would be facilitated by 
changes in the law that would permit, inter alia, multi-employer bargaining 
where requested by the union, bargaining units determined by the desires of the 
employees, inclusion of independent contractors under the NLRA, and secondary 
boycotts within a network of related employers.75 
Other scholars have taken a slightly different route, focusing on the need for 
unions to appeal to the increasing portion of the workforce composed of persons 
of color and white women. Professor Marion Crain, frequently writing with Ken 
Matheny, has been a leading advocate for this approach. In a series of articles, 
she has suggested that unions have focused on class consciousness to the 
exclusion of other relevant aspects of worker identity such as gender, race and 
ethnicity. 76 A transformation of the labor movement is required to enable it to 
effectively represent all workers and combat the employers' strategy of "divide 
and conquer."77 Crain and Matheny suggest legal reforms to enforce this basic 
shift in labor movement ideology. Like other scholars, Crain and Matheny 
advocate elimination of the majority rule and exclusive representation 
requirement, suggesting that it will permit advocacy by nonlabor groups and 
allow organization around multiple identities, such as race and gender. 78 Further, 
74. See OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 118 (discussing the South Bay Labor 
Council's program in Silicon Valley creating a temporary employment agency to raise 
wages and improve employment stability for temporary workers); Dorothy Sue Cobble, 
Lost Ways of Unionism: Historical Perspectives on Reinventing the Labor Movement, 
in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT, supra note 54, at 82, 84-87 (describing occupational 
unionism of the past and current efforts to revive that form of unionism); Cornfield, 
supra note 73, at 38; Heckscher, supra note 73, at 68-69, 75-78 (describing the foci of 
unions in the increasingly mobile workforce and examples of organizations working 
toward such a model); Stone, supra note 67, at 802-10 (describing "new craft unionism"). 
75. Stone, supra note 67, at 816-18. 
76. Crain, Between Feminism, supra note 53, at 1906-08; Crain, Colorblind, supra 
note 53, at 1313; Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1543-45; see also Michael Selmi 
& Molly S. McUsic, Difference and Solidarity: Unions in a Postmodern Age, in LABOUR 
LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 
429, 431-33 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002) (criticizing unions for failure to focus 
on race, gender and ethnicity). 
77. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1609-13. 
78. Id. at 1617-19. Crain and Matheny suggest that the change would make 
economic tactics such as boycotts and picketing both more effective and perhaps lawful 
in contexts currently prohibited, such as secondary boycotts. Id. at 1623. More recently, 
Crain has advocated making race and ethnicity factors in determining appropriate 
bargaining units because ignoring racial and ethnic identity perpetuates racial 
disadvantage. Crain, Colorblind, supra note 53. For another critique of the legal 
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they urge imposition of a requirement that unions work affirmatively to eliminate 
discrimination rather than merely decline to participate in it.79 In conjunction 
with this recommendation, they suggest that arbitration of statutory 
discrimination claims should be a mandatory subject of bargaining and that 
arbitration of such claims through a union negotiated procedure should preclude 
later litigation. 8° Crain and Matheny argue that there is far less risk of 
disadvantage to workers in arbitration of statutory claims where the procedure 
and representation are negotiated by the union.81 
Critics have suggested identity-based organizing as a tool to broaden the 
appeal of unions.82 The proposals vary from recommendations that union 
organizing campaigns focus on multiple aspects of employee identity,83 to 
suggested organization of caucuses as precursors to unions or within unions, 84 
to arguments that racial and ethnic identity be a factor in deciding the appropriate 
bargaining unit in union organizing campaigns.85 
Virtually all of the proposals recommend significant changes in the law to 
enable achievement of their objectives. While some incremental change can 
occur without legal alteration, and indeed most scholars offer current or historic 
examples to support their recommendations,86 in the end legal change will be 
system's impact on subordinated groups, see Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of 
Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395 (1993) (criticizing the courts and Board for interpreting 
Title VII and the NLRA in ways that continue the subordination of women of color). 
79. Crain & Matheny, supra note 2, at 1839-41. 
80. Id. at 1841-46. 
81. Id. at 1842-45. 
82. See, e.g., Crain, Colorblind, supra note 53, at 1331-34; Alan Hyde, Employee 
Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHl.-KENT 
L. REV. 149, 158-62 ( 1993) (suggesting use of caucuses inside the union); Iglesias, supra 
note 78, at 478-88 (advocating self-representation for women of color); Maria L. 
Ontiveros, A New Course for Labor Unions: Identity-Based Organizing as a Response 
to Globalization, in LABOUR LAW, supra note 76, at 417, 417,422-24; see also Selmi & 
McUsic, supra note 76, at 434-35 (describing various proposals for identity organizing). 
83. Ontiveros, supra note 82, at 417-21. 
84. Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual 
Harassment: The Untold Story, 4 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 61, 66-76 (1995) 
(recommending use of identity caucuses to represent women within the union, 
particularly in the context of sexual harassment grievances); Ruben J. Garcia, New Voices 
at Work: Race and Gender Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 79 (2002) (supporting identity caucuses within unions); Hyde, supra note 82, at 160-
62. 
85. Crain, Colorblind, supra note 53, at 1331-32. 
86. OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 105-22 (citing various examples ofunion 
responses to changes in the labor market, including successful efforts at organizing 
professionals and managers, low income workers and contingent workers); Cobble, supra 
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essential to transformation. Change in the law may come about, however, 
because of demonstrated efficacy of new models on a small scale. One 
recommendation for change that necessitates no change in law is negotiation of 
a mediation provision in current contracts that applies to issues not covered by 
the agreement. The analysis below demonstrates that use of mediation may be 
an incremental change that may help to achieve some of the important broader 
goals articulated above. 
II. MEDIATION OF DISPUTES OUTSIDE THE COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
A. Contractual Grievance and Arbitration Provisions 
Almost all collective bargaining agreements contain grievance and 
arbitration procedures designed to resolve disputes about the interpretation and 
application of the agreement. The common structure for such provisions is a 
series of steps in which progressively higher level officials of the company and 
union attempt to resolve the dispute, culminating in binding arbitration by a 
neutral arbitrator.87 In most contracts, the arbitrator is confined to interpreting 
and applying the agreement. A few contracts incorporate disputes outside the 
agreement into the grievance procedure and some also provide for arbitration of 
such disputes. In addition, sometimes there is overlap between the provisions of 
the contract and provisions oflaw, such that arbitration of a contract dispute may 
note 74, at 84-87 (describing efforts to revive occupational unionism); Marion Crain, 
Whitewashed labor law, Skin walking Unions, 23 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 211, 224-
28, 228-29 (2002) (describing coalition of traditional union and African-American 
religious community to address racial discrimination and economic oppression, and union 
efforts to organize immigrant workers by focusing on their unique needs); Crain & 
Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-19 (providing examples of non labor groups engaged in 
worker advocacy supporting women and all people of color, in some cases collaborating 
with traditional unions); Hecksher, supra note 73, at 75-78 (describing the efforts of 
organizations to provide workers with security, power, and voice in the new economy); 
Ontiveros, supra note 82, at 418-21 (describing union campaigns using identity-based 
organizing); Stone, supra note 67, at 804-08, 814-16 (providing current examples of new 
craft unionism by International Alliance of Theatrical and State Employees ("IA TSE"), 
Justice for Janitors, and several hotel and construction unions, and the historic example 
of waitress unions. Stone also provides examples of what she calls "citizen unions," 
community-based organizations that address the issues of workers and citizens across 
various workplaces.). 
87. Some contracts provide for joint arbitration boards composed of equal numbers 
of management and union representatives, either with or without a subsequent appeal to 
a neutral arbitrator. 
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effectively resolve legal issues as well. 88 The Supreme Court has stated, 
however, that an employee cannot be precluded from litigating a legal claim by 
a union contractual provision providing for arbitration unless it clearly and 
unmistakably waives the employee's right to a judicial forum.89 It is not 
uncommon for arbitrators to deal with legal issues in resolving contractual claims 
because of the substantial potential for overlap of legal and contractual claims. 
The law is often used as an aid to interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
B. Grievance Mediation 
In the past twenty years, there has been a resurgence of interest in grievance 
mediation, which was more commonly used in the early years of contractual 
grievance procedures. 9° Current usage of mediation for contractual disputes adds 
a mediation step in the contractual procedure prior to arbitration. 91 The parties 
to the agreement determine which grievances will be mediated. If initial 
discussions do not result in an agreement, the mediator, who is also an 
experienced arbitrator, offers a prediction as to how an arbitrator would decide 
the dispute. The parties can then pursue additional discussions, with unresolved 
grievances proceeding to arbitration with a different neutral and without use of 
any information revealed in mediation. The benefits of mediating grievances 
have been ably articulated by Professors Steve Goldberg and Jeanne Brett, who 
began experimenting with grievance mediation in the coal industry.92 They 
found that mediation resolved disputes more quickly, with less investment of 
party resources, and greater participant satisfaction.93 The parties were able to 
focus on interest-based problem solving rather than taking the win/lose positions 
88. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. the Supreme Court found that arbitration 
of a contractual claim challenging the employee's discharge, which overlapped with a 
legal claim that the discharge violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, did not preclude 
the employee's lawsuit on the race discrimination claim. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974). 
89. Wright v. Universal Mar. Servs. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1998). 
90. See Helen El kiss, Alternatives to Arbitration: Are Unions Ready for Change?, 
48 LAB. L.J. 675, 677-80 (1997); Feuille, supra note 5, at 187; Stephen B. Goldberg, The 
Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to 
Arbitration, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 270 (1982). 
91. This description of current grievance mediation is based on the model used by 
Stephen Goldberg and Jeanne Brett in the mediation experiment in the coal industry. 
Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, An Experiment in the Mediation of Grievances, 
106 MONTHL y LAB. REV., Mar. 1983, at 23. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 26-27. 
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typical of arbitration.94 In addition, mediation helped preserve the ongoing 
relationship of the parties and assisted them in developing their own problem 
solving skills.95 Mediation has been successful at resolving contractual 
grievances at low cost and high satisfaction in those relationships in which it has 
been adopted.96 Although favorable reports about grievance mediation are 
legion, it has remained limited to a small part of the unionized workforce.97 
C. Mediation of Claims Not Covered by the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Despite the spread of grievance mediation and mediation of disputes in the 
nonunion workplace,98 there has been little discussion of mediation of 
noncontractual claims in the unionized workplace. The one significant exception 
is the Postal Service's REDRESS system.99 There has been some effort to 
require exclusive arbitration of statutory claims in the unionized workplace, 
however. '00 While I have argued elsewhere that it is risky for unions to waive 
employees' statutory rights to litigate, 101 mediation offers an opportunity for 
unions to provide a nonbinding forum for resolution of workplace disputes that 
are not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Such disputes would 
include statutory and common law legal claims, such as discrimination or 
wrongful termination, and nonlegal disputes such as communication problems 
or interpersonal conflicts. There are benefits to mediation for employees, unions 
and employers alike which make it a feasible option for collective bargaining. 
94. See Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perspectives on the 
Differences Between Mediation and Arbitration, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 249, 253-54 (1990). 
95. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Grievance Mediation: A Successful Alternative to 
labor Arbitration, 5 NEGOTIATION J. 9, 12-13 (1989). 
96. Elkiss, supra note 90, at 677-80; Feuille, supra note 5, at 187, 191-95. 
97. Feuille, supra note 5, at 197. 
98. See infra notes 259-68 and accompanying text. 
99. Lisa B. Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment 
Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIO Sr. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 341, 356 (2002). 
100. See Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that language of collective bargaining agreement clearly and unmistakably waived 
employee's right to litigate her discrimination claim, leaving arbitration as her only 
forum); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'! v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 485-86 
(D.C. Cir. 1999), enf'd, 211 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that individual 
agreements to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims are not mandatory subjects of 
bargaining and therefore employer could unilaterally impose them on union employees 
without bargaining with the union). 
101. See Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: 
The Fourth Circuit's Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPLOYEE Rrs. 
& EMP. POL'Y J. 123 (1998). 
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Accordingly, unions and employers should seriously consider an agreement to 
offer mediation of all workplace disputes. 
Mediation of noncontractual claims should be voluntary, at least on the part 
of the employee. 102 Dispute resolution academics have debated the merits of 
voluntary versus mandatory mediation. 103 Voluntary mediation minimizes duty 
of fair representation concerns for the union, which may be a particular concern 
when employees mediate legal claims. 104 Because of the risk of fair 
representation claims, voluntary mediation will be preferable from the union's 
point of view. While the risk is not as great for nonlegal claims, employers may 
be reluctant to agree to a mediation procedure which does not cover legal 
claims. 105 Employees may also resist a system that requires mediation of legal 
claims. Thus, voluntary mediation is most likely to be adopted. 106 In order for 
a voluntary system to be effective, however, the union and employer must 
educate employees about mediation and advocate effectively for the program. 107 
The forum should give employees the choice of representation by the union 
or any other representative selected by the employee. While many employees 
might choose union representation, others may prefer attorneys or other 
102. If the employer has an existing mediation program for nonunion employees, 
the parties could consider opening it up to union employees on a voluntary basis. Before 
agreeing to such a program, however, the union should evaluate the program to ensure 
that it indeed provides a benefit to the employees and permits representation by the union 
or other chosen representatives. Alternatively, the union-negotiated system could be 
opened up to nonunion employees to increase utilization and make it more cost effective 
for the employer. An added benefit for the union would be the prospect of convincing 
nonunion employees of the benefits of unionization. 
103. See SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE§ 7.3, at 
7-11 (2d ed. 2001). 
104. See infra Part 11.G (discussing duty of fair representation issues). 
I 05. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. 
106. But see Goldberg & Brett, supra note 91, at 29 (noting the high settlement 
rates when grievance mediation is required at the option of one party or for all 
grievances, and recommending further research on mandatory mediation). 
107. The REDRESS system has had significant utilization despite its voluntary 
nature. Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Transforming Workplace Culture Through Mediation: 
Lessons Learned from Swimming Upstream, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 375, 379 
(2001) (stating that twenty thousand cases were mediated in the first two years after full 
implementation of the program). Of course, most employers do not have the substantial 
number of potential parties and disputes present at the Postal Service. A pilot mediation 
program for state employees in Ohio found that a relatively small number of cases were 
actually mediated. L. Camille Hebert, Establishing and Evaluating a Workplace 
Mediation Pilot Project: An Ohio Case Study, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 415, 424 
(1999). Evaluators suggested that insufficient promotion of the program, supervisor and 
employee hostility, and administrative difficulties may have contributed to the limited use 
of the program. Id. at 439-42. 
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advocates. In addition, the process should use outside mediators if at all 
possible. Outside mediators are preferable to internal mediators because they are 
perceived as fairer, and the perception of fairness or procedural justice is 
important to the success of any mediation program. 108 
A more complex question is the type of mediation that should be chosen. 
Before discussing that issue, however, a review of both the potential benefits of 
such a mediation program and the empirical evidence about existing mediation 
programs is appropriate. 
1. Benefits for the Union 
Negotiation of a mediation forum allows unions to provide an additional 
benefit to represented employees, thereby strengthening the employee support 
for the union, which will assist the union in continuing as the employees' 
representative. The employees will not only obtain a forum for vindicating 
statutory rights without waiver of their right to litigate, but they will also acquire 
a vehicle for resolving other disputes that may make their work life difficult, but 
are not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. In addition, the trained 
and experienced union representatives who serve as advocates in the mediation 
process can represent employees in other forums. 109 The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") currently uses mediation in many 
discrimination disputes. 110 The Department of Labor also has begun to use 
108. Lisa B. Bingham & David W. Pitts, Highlights of Mediation at Work: Studies 
of the National REDRESS Evaluation Project, 18 NEGOTIATION J. 135, 138-39 (2002) 
(reporting that participant satisfaction rates for process, outcome and mediator were 
higher when outside mediators were used as compared to inside mediators, but noting 
that levels of satisfaction were high with both models); Traci Gabhart Gann & Cynthia 
J. Hallberlin, Recruiting and Training Outside Neutrals, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
DISPUTE REsOLUTION DESKBOOK 623, 623 (Marshall J. Breger et al. eds., 2001 ); Jennie 
Kihnley, Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the Handling of Sexual 
Harassment Complaints, 25 LA w & Soc. INQUIRY 69, 73 (2000) (discussing importance 
of perception of mediator neutrality and concerns that internal mediators may be 
pressured to reach solutions favorable to the employer); see also Ann C. Hodges, 
Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L. REV. 431, 485-93 (1996) 
(discussing the relative merits of using internal versus outside mediators in mediation 
programs conducted by administrative enforcement agencies). 
109. Mediation training may assist advocates in representing employees in 
investigatory interviews as permitted by NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 
(1975). 
110. See E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM (2000), at http://www. 
eeoc.gov/mediate/report/chapter2.html (last modified Oct. 2, 2000); Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission's Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy Statement, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/adrstatement.html (last modified Mar. 25, 2002); 
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mediation in disputes involving ERISA, the FMLA, and various whistleblower 
laws. 111 Union representatives could serve as employee advocates in these 
governmental mediation programs. 
Trained union representatives also could provide services to unrepresented 
employees in employer-adopted dispute resolution systems. 112 Advocacy for 
nonunion employees could enhance the union's prospects for organizing 
additional workplaces and even growing members where the union does not 
represent a majority. 113 In addition, the problem solving experience gained 
through participation in mediation will aid union and employer representatives 
in resolving disputes in the grievance and arbitration procedure and perhaps even 
in collective bargaining negotiations, thus improving the collective bargaining 
relationship to the benefit of the union, the employer, and the employees. 114 
Because the mediation option will cover both statutory discrimination 
claims and other statutory claims of strong interest to groups that have 
historically been perceived as outsiders to the union culture, 11 s mediation offers 
unions a vehicle for greater inclusion. The mediation procedure provides a 
forum for resolution of such disputes, and union representation and support to 
achieve resolution. In addition, it provides the union with an opportunity to 
include more employee/members in union activities. Mediation offers an 
Dominguez Reports Drop in Charge Inventory, Expanded Mediation Emphasis in Fiscal 
2002, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 204, at A-6 (Oct. 22, 2002) (reporting on EEOC's 
expansion of its mediation program in 2002 to become largest workplace mediation 
program in the U.S.); Another New Mediation Project at EEOC Expands Efforts to Nine 
State, Local Agencies, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 79, at A-5 {Apr. 24, 2003) (reporting 
on EEOC's expansion of mediation program to allow charges filed with the EEOC in 
nine states to be mediated by state and local agencies with which the EEOC maintains 
worksharing agreements). 
111. See DOL Seeks to Expand Use of Mediators to Resolve Disputes Under 
Employment Laws, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 01, at AA-I (Jan. 2, 2001). 
112. Internal employer dispute resolution programs may take on increased 
importance as the EEOC is beginning a pilot program in which it will defer 
discrimination charges to certain existing employer programs upon agreement of the 
charging party. Dominguez to Intensify Mediation Efforts During Second Full Year at 
EEOC Helm, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at S-43 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
113. DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 48, at 163; see also supra notes 69-72 and 
accompanying text. Since the Weingarten right to representation at investigatory 
interviews has been extended to the nonunion workplace, Epilepsy Foundation of 
Northeast Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), enf'd in relevant part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001 ), union advocates might provide representation for nonunion employees in such 
situations. Again, such representation may enhance the union's prospects for selection 
as majority representative. 
114. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
115. One example of such a statute is the FMLA, providing unpaid leave for 
childbirth, adoption and serious family illness. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). 
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effective method for resolving Title VII disputes. 116 Professor Yelnosky 
advocates the use of employee identity caucuses to balance power in Title VII 
mediations. 117 Such caucuses, informal networks of employees generally formed 
on the basis of race, ethnicity or gender, 118 are controversial. While some, like 
Yelnosky, have urged their value in addressing workplace problems unique to, 
or at least more salient to, group members, 119 others have argued that caucuses 
divide the employees in ways that decrease their power as a unit and enable the 
employer to divide and conquer. 120 Those who support identity caucuses suggest 
that the caucuses can establish collaborative relationships to consolidate power 
without losing the ability to foster the goals of the identity group. 121 
While some might suggest that identity groups must form outside the union 
structure to be effective, union facilitation of identity groups can further union 
efforts to include women and men of color. 122 Interested members of such 
identity groups or caucuses could be trained to represent employees in mediation. 
Such a role could be extremely important in discrimination disputes, including 
harassment issues, which at times involve one union member accused of 
harassing another. 123 In addition to caucuses, the union could facilitate 
relationships with outside social justice organizations that would be willing to 
116. Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 19990.ILL. 
L. REV. 583, 597-604 (noting that mediation is often quicker, cheaper, and easier to 
access, and allows the parties to seek interest-based solutions, which may alter workplace 
practices). 
117. Id. at 613-21. Yelnosky argues that unions cannot perform this function 
because of their history of discrimination, their lack of diverse leadership, and their 
maj oritarian character, not to mention the decreasing rate of unionization. Id. at 611-12. 
118. Id. at 613-14. They may be called identity groups, networks, or affinity 
groups, but their defining characteristic is organization on the basis of social identity with 
a goal of addressing workplace issues relevant to their identity. Id. For some examples 
of the work of identity groups within employer organizations, see OSTERMAN ET AL., 
supra note 52, at 120-22. 
119. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-19. 
120. Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in 
the Workplace, 82 IOWAL. REV. 1339, 1354-58 (1997); see also Crain & Matheny, supra 
note 2, at 1783 (citing criticism of identity politics by scholars and activists). Employers 
also have mixed views of identity groups, with some finding them threatening and others 
viewing the groups as encouraging employee participation. OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 
52, at 121. 
121. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-19. 
122. See Garcia, supra note 84, at 83; Hyde, supra note 82, at 161-62. 
123. Cf Mary K. O'Melveny, Negotiating the Minefields: Selected Issues for 
Labor Unions Addressing Sexual Harassment Complaints by Represented Employees, 
15 LAB. LA w. 321, 352 (2000) (recommending use of separate union stewards for each 
employee in cases involving harassment accusations by one union member against 
another). 
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provide such representation when requested. Again, such connections could 
assist the union as well as the employees by creating partnerships that would 
benefit the union and the social justice organizations in other arenas. 124 Such 
organizations might support union organizing efforts and aid the union in 
economic and legal disputes with employers where representation rights are 
already established. 125 They might provide assistance to workers who lose jobs 
or income because of strikes, or to low wage workers who often have family, 
educational and financial needs in addition to work issues. 126 At the same time, 
the union can support social justice organizations in their efforts to bring about 
change in the community or to assist poor and working people. For example, the 
partnership of AFSCME and BUILD, an organization of church congregations 
in the black community in Baltimore, succeeded in convincing the city to enact 
a living wage ordinance. 127 The two groups also created a membership 
organization for workers, and city contractors agreed to deduct the membership 
dues from workers' pay.1 28 
124. See OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 131-47 (discussing various newly 
emerging institutions that play roles that overlap with unions, including workplace 
advocacy organizations, immigrants' rights groups and living wage coalitions, some of 
which partner with unions); Michelle Amber, New, Tax-Exempt Rights-At-Work Group 
Being Created by Several Unions, AFL-CIO, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at C-1 (Feb. 
27, 2003) (describing new organization established by unions to support workers' rights 
to organize, which includes as one strategy working with Jobs with Justice, the National 
Interfaith Committee for Worker Justice and other workers' rights and civil rights 
groups); Janice Fine, Community Unionism: The Key to the New Labor Movement, 
PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, Aug. 1997, at 32 (describing collaboration between an 
organization of African-American church congregations and AFSCME in Baltimore to 
organize low income service workers); Dorian T. Warren & Cathy J. Cohen, Organizing 
at the Intersection of labor and Civil Rights: A Case Study of New Haven, 2 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 629 (2000) (urging labor unions to forge alliances with social justice 
organizations and offering the New Haven Community and Labor Coalition as an 
example of successful collaboration). 
125. See Erickson et al., supra note 52, at 563-65 (discussing the importance of 
coalition-building with politicians, churches and other unions in the Justice for Janitors 
organizing campaigns, subsequent contract negotiations, and resulting strike). 
126. Ruth Needleman, Building Relationships for the Long Haul: Unions and 
Community-Based Groups Working Together to Organize Low-Wage Workers, in 
ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 71, 72, 73 (Kate 
Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998). 
127. See Fine, supra note 124, at 33, 35. 
128. See id. at 33, 35. Fine argues that this partnership is an example of 
community unionism, which "takes account of broad worker identities and interests ... 
. some that are connected to occupation or employer, some that are not-but most of 
which are relevant to organizing." Id. at 34; see also Needleman, supra note 126, at 74-
82. Needleman describes two such cooperative efforts. In California, Asian Immigrant 
Women Advocates and several labor organizations engaged in a campaign to pressure a 
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Finally, mediation can provide a forum for resolution of disputes within the 
union. There is no legal impediment to the union negotiating a voluntary forum 
for resolving disputes between employees or between employees and the 
union. 129 Interpersonal conflicts or communication problems between union 
members may affect the employees' ability to work together, both in their paid 
employment and in their unpaid status as union members, and may potentially 
subject them to employer discipline if the dispute affects their work. Legal 
issues like harassment may also involve employees as both harasser and 
harassee. 130 Resolution of such disputes will benefit the employees involved by 
preventing discipline and making their work life more pleasant, and will assist 
the union in building a more cohesive membership to maintain power vis-a-vis 
the employer. Even if the dispute is not resolved, providing a forum for 
employee voice may defuse the dispute and, in the long run, pay dividends in 
other ways, such as improving solidarity among union members. To the extent 
that legal disputes, such as duty of fair representation claims, disputes over the 
union's use of dues, or claims ofunion discrimination, can be resolved fairly, the 
union will benefit in the same way as the employer from low cost, quick, 
interest-based settlement. 131 
2. Benefits for Employees 
Mediation would present employees the opportunity to resolve disputes 
without litigation, in a forum which is voluntary and nonbinding. Their right to 
litigate any legal claims would be preserved if no resolution was reached in 
mediation. Thus, unlike arbitration, the employee would not have to forego any 
rights and remedies except by voluntary agreement reached in mediation. 
garment manufacturer to pay workers back w-:-, . · ··: iaid by contractors and to create an 
education fund and hotline for garment workers. Id. at 78-82. Also in California, the 
nonprofit organization Labor Project for Working Families and the Service Employees 
International Union obtained grant funding to create centers to provide support for home 
health workers-social activities, a health clinic, immigration and legal advice, job 
referrals and opportunities to meet with their union representatives. Id. 
129. The union may be legally limited in its ability to waive employee rights where 
there is a possible conflict of interest between the employees and the union. See, e.g., 
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974). 
130. For additional discussion of issues unique to harassment, see infra Part Il.F.2. 
131. For discussion of conflict issues arising in disputes between employees or 
employees and the union, see infra Part 11.G. Some issues, such as discrimination, may 
involve claims against both the employer and the union. For discussion of issues that 
may arise in such cases, see Indira Talwani, Settlement and Mediation of Individual 
Employment Disputes in the Unionized Workplace, in ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIITEE, 2002 MIDWINTER 
MEETING, PROGRAM MATERIALS (2002). 
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Mediation may resolve legal disputes early and at low cost. 132 Such resolution 
may prevent legal issues from escalating. In harassment cases, for example, 
evidence indicates that many victims simply want the harassment to stop.133 
They do not want to sue their employer and desire to avoid the pain and publicity 
of a trial, choosing litigation only as a last resort. A mediation forum provides 
a more private method of dealing with the abuse. 
In addition to legal claims, the mediation forum could provide an 
opportunity to deal with other disputes not covered by contract or law. For 
example, communication problems and interpersonal disputes often cause 
significant conflict in the workforce which leads to lost productivity and low 
morale.134 These difficulties are not typically covered by the collective 
bargaining agreement, although efforts might well be made by employees and 
unions to fit them under the rubric of the grievance procedure to achieve 
resolution. Mediation offers a forum to deal with such disputes without the need 
132. In a small study of EEO mediation cases before a human rights agency, "early 
and timely use of mediation ... appeared as a very significant factor in determining 
disputants' degree of satisfaction" with both the process and outcome of mediation and 
with the mediator's skills and abilities. Arup Varma & Lamont E. Stallworth, 
Participants ' Satisfaction with EEO Mediation and the Issue of Legal Representation: 
An Empirical Inquiry, 6 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 387, 411 (2002). 
133. See Kihnley, supra note 108, at 82 (reporting that individuals in universities 
who handled sexual harassment complaints reported that many complainants simply want 
harassment to cease); Mary P. Rowe, People who Feel Harassed Need a Complaint 
System with Both Formal and Informal Options, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 161, 164-65 (1990) 
(finding based on the author's experience as an ombudsperson dealing with 
approximately six thousand persons over sixteen years that seventy-five percent or more 
of complainants just want harassment to stop); Carrie A. Bond, Note, Shattering the 
Myth: Mediating Sexual Harassment Disputes in the Workplace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2489, 2501 (1997). Evidence also indicates, however, that many victims do not report 
harassment, making mediation a less viable solution. See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION 
Bo., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, 
CONTINUING CHALLENGES 33 ( 1995) (finding in a survey of federal workers that only six 
percent of workers who had suffered from sexual harassment reported their harassment); 
Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the 
Military, 83 MINN. L. REV. 305, 305 (1998) (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR REsEARCH 
ON WOMEN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: RESEARCH AND RESOURCES 10 (1995))(finding that 
one to seven percent of women who report having suffered from harassment file a formal 
complaint). 
134. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Dispute Resolution in the Boundaryless 
Workplace, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 467, 481 (2001) (suggesting the use of 
mediation to resolve disputes relating to miscommunication and disputes where 
"emotional factors or personality traits prevent parties from resolving differences 
themselves"). Stone argues that a promise of fair treatment is necessary to recruit and 
retain employees and to induce them to work cooperatively for the benefit of the 
employer. Id. at 479-80. 
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to attempt to structure the disagreement to meet the contractual definition of a 
grievance. 135 Resolution of such disputes will improve workplace morale for 
employees and may prevent future discipline problems. For the employees, 
mediation would provide an opportunity to resolve disputes that previously had 
no forum. 136 
The solutions available in mediation are more flexible than in court, where 
remedies are limited by the law. Mediation can provide for interest-based 
solutions such as apologies, reassignment of employees or supervisors to 
different jobs or departments, sensitivity or communication training, or simply 
an end to certain behaviors. 137 Even in cases where employment has been 
severed amid allegations of discrimination or other statutory violations, 
reinstatement might be a viable solution in an early mediation where back pay 
has not accumulated, positions have not hardened, and the union is present to 
ease the renewal of the employment relationship. 138 
Mediation may provide a better forum for resolving what Professor Susan 
Sturm has called "second-generation" discrimination issues. 139 While intentional 
135. In addition to mediation, the parties might consider whether other dispute 
resolution methods that have been adopted in the nonunion workplace, such as ombuds 
or peer review, would be useful. Dispute resolution scholars recommend procedures with 
multiple options so that the forum fits the dispute. See, e.g., Mary Rowe, Dispute 
Resolution in the Non-Union Environment, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra 
note 42, at 79, 84. 
136. While "workplace bullying" or harassment that does not come within the 
statutory discrimination laws is probably not a widespread problem in the unionized 
workplace due to union protections, mediation might offer a forum for such disputes if 
not covered by the existing collective bargaining agreement. See David C. Yamada, The 
Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work 
Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 488-89 (2000) (noting that bullying is less 
likely in the unionized workplace because of contractual protections and informal dispute 
resolution efforts by the union, but citing example oflawsuit involving bullying ofunion 
steward); see also Spartan Equip. Co., 297 N.L.R.B. 19, 19 (1989) (finding individual 
employee's filing of criminal charge against employer to be protected concerted activity 
because he was attempting to further his efforts to act as union spokesperson without 
intimidation by the employer). 
13 7. Interest-based solutions focus not on legal remedies available by right but on 
resolutions that meet the interests of the parties. Of course, not all mediation is focused 
on interests. Mediation can also focus on rights, and legal mediation often does. See 
WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED 4-5 (1988). 
138. Available evidence indicates that the reinstatement remedy works more 
effectively in the unionized environment. See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text. 
Of course in any termination case there will inevitably be overlap with the just cause 
provision of the collective bargaining agreement. For a discussion of the overlap issue, 
see infra Part H.F. 
139. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). 
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discrimination certainly still exists, current discrimination often results from 
unconscious bias which is embedded in workplace structures and patterns of 
interaction over time. These structures and patterns exclude from higher paying 
jobs women and other groups that have historically been subjected to 
discrimination. Because the exclusion results from structural features rather than 
intentional discrimination, it is difficult to challenge under existing legal 
doctrines. 140 Professor Sturm suggests that various actors both within and 
outside the workplace can play problem solving roles in changing workplace 
structures that result in discriminatory exclusion or harassment. 141 She offers 
several examples of such change, including one resulting from a mediated 
settlement of a discrimination case against Home Depot brought by women. 142 
The mediation forum, and the availability of the union as an additional interested 
and knowledgeable actor, may facilitate resolution of discrimination issues that 
resist conventional judicial solutions. 143 
Perhaps most important, employees obtain the possibility of free or low cost 
union representation in the mediation process. Representation is viewed as 
fundamental to fairness in dispute resolution processes. 144 While employees 
have many statutory rights, their ability to enforce these rights is limited by their 
140. Id. at 465-78. 
141. Id. at 479-537. As one example of such structures, she describes the hiring 
and promotion procedures at Home Depot which used subjective decision-making in an 
organization with a predominently male culture, resulting in exclusion of white women 
and people of color from many jobs. Id. at 510-13; see also Yelnosky, supra note 116, 
at 601-02 (citing reports of changes in workplace rules, policies and practices resulting 
from mediation). 
142. Sturm, supra note 139, at 509-19. The settlement created a new hiring and 
promotion system to ensure consideration of white women, people of color and older 
workers foralljobs. Id. at512-19. 
143. See id. at 533-34 (describing the role of the Harvard Union of Clerical and 
Technical Workers in creating joint councils to deal with workplace organization and 
policy. Sturm also recounts the role of representatives of an employee organization in 
crafting settlement of a race discrimination claim.). Notably, four often employers with 
dispute resolution programs studied by the GAO indicated that such programs alerted 
management to systemic concerns in the workplace, which in some cases led to changes 
in company procedures and policies. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATNE 
DISPUTES RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 27 
(1997) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
144. See American Arbitration Association, Due Process Protocol for Mediation 
and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship (May 
9, 1995), available athttp://www.adr.org/index2. I .j sp? JSPssid= l 5769&JSPsrc=upload 
\LIVESITE\Ru Jes_ Procedures\Protoco ls\ .. \ .. \focusArea \emp I oyment\protocol .html; 
Bingham et al., supra note 99, at 346; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 843-44 
(2001 ). 
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ability to expend the resources necessary to do so. Obtaining legal 
representation is difficult for employees, other than highly-paid executives, 
because of the cost relative to the remedy available. 145 And, as noted above, 
even where the statute provides for employer-paid attorneys' fees for prevailing 
employees, attorneys are reluctant to accept cases without strong evidence at the 
outset that a victory is likely. 146 Such overwhelming evidence is rare, particularly 
prior to discovery. As many scholars have noted, unions may help fill this 
representation gap. 
Union representation also helps balance power. 147 Rather than the lone 
employee against the employer, the employee has the strength of the union on his 
or her side. This assistance reduces the disadvantage to employees that might 
result from the lack of institutional protections to minimize bias. 148 In some 
situations, of course, the union may be of little assistance in this regard, as the 
union itself may be a source of bias. 149 The option of other representation, such 
as employee caucuses, outside social justice organizations or lawyers, will 
provide an alternative to the employee desiring representation other than the 
145. See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: 
Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 256, 288-89 
(1994) (discussing the difficulties employees face in obtaining counsel); Maltby, supra 
note 43, at 58 (same); St. Antoine, supra note 46, at 91 (same). 
146. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. 
147. See National Labor Relations Act§ l, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). Empirical data 
demonstrate that unionized employees are more likely than similar nonunion employees 
to obtain benefits and enforce statutory rights. See John W. Budd & Brian P. McCall, 
The Effect of Unions on the Receipt of Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 50 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 478, 488 (1997) (finding that unionized employees are more likely than 
nonunion employees to collect unemployment compensation benefits, even after 
controlling for differences in demographics, unemployment compensation systems, and 
jobs); Barry T. Hirsch et al., Workers 'Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion 
Workplaces, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 213, 218, 233 (1997) (finding that unionized 
workers were more likely to file workers' compensation claims and more likely to receive 
workers' compensation benefits); David Weil, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor 
Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20, 26-34 (1991) (finding that unions increase enforcement of 
OSHA in the manufacturing sector, resulting in more frequent inspections, more 
employee representation on inspections, more intense inspections, greater numbers of 
violations found and greater penalties). Union status likely enhances the probability of 
benefit receipt and statutory enforcement because the union provides information about 
risks, rights and benefits, represents the employees, and offers protection from retaliation. 
Budd & McCall, supra, at 490-91; Hirsch et al., supra, at 217, 233; Weil, supra, at 20-
22. In short, the empirical data suggest that unions improve the prospects for collecting 
benefits by assisting employees in exercising their statutory rights. 
148. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
149. See Crain, Colorblind, supra note 53, at 1322-25 (discussing the role of 
unions in exploitation of people of color); Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1593-96 
(discussing the role of the labor movement in the exploitation of women). 
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union. 150 The presence of a knowledgeable and trained representative can 
prevent the employee from being pressured into a settlement that inappropriately 
waives legal rights. 
The union's institutional memory can assist the employee in making her 
case. 151 In many discrimination cases, for example, the most relevant evidence 
may be the treatment of other employees similar to, and different from, the 
plaintiff. While the plaintiff may have limited information about the employer's 
treatment of other employees, the union has far more information and may even 
be able to persuade other employees to provide evidentiary support for the 
plaintiff. 152 This information will assist in negotiating a favorable settlement for 
the plaintiff/employee. 
3. Benefits for Employers 
One question regarding a recommendation for an additional forum for 
employee complaints is why an employer should agree to such a forum. One 
answer is that many employers are already offering mediation unilaterally. 153 
150. See infra notes 314-18 and accompanying text. In the nonunion ADR 
program at TRW, a diversified manufacturing company, employees used attorneys in 
about half of the cases, but in others employees brought other representatives, such as 
spouses and, in one case, a priest. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Adoption and Use of Dispute 
Resolution Procedures in the Nonunion Workplace 28 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the author). A report on the program indicated that in many cases these non-
attorney representatives were forceful advocates for the employee. Id. 
151. See Talwani, supra note 131, at 6. The union can provide this assistance even 
where it is not representing the employee. 
152. The plaintiff may have rumors or hearsay information at best, but the union 
may have grievance records, union stewards who represented employees in grievances, 
or greater access to the employees themselves, who may be more willing to share their 
stories at the urging of the union. 
153. A 1997 Cornell University study surveyed corporate counsel from the one 
thousand largest United States corporations about ADR. David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. 
Seeber, In Search of Control: The Corporate Embrace of ADR, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 133 ( 1998) [hereinafter Lipsky & Seeber, In Search of Controlj. Eighty-eight percent 
of respondents reported using mediation at least once in the previous three years. Id. at 
137. Eighty-four percent indicated that they were likely or very likely to use mediation 
in the future. Id. at 153. And the survey indicated that mediation was being used in 
almost every industry. Id. at 157. More specific data on employment disputes from the 
same study reveal that mediation is used more often in employment disputes than any 
other category, and that industries across the board prefer mediation to other forms of 
ADR for resolution of employment disputes. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, 
Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. 1999, at 66, 68, 69 
[hereinafter Lipsky & Seeber, Patterns]. Further, survey respondents predicted that the 
use of mediation in employment disputes would grow significantly. DAVID B. LIPSKY & 
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Whether the motive is altruistic or self-serving, employer-sponsored mediation 
is becoming more widely available. 154 The most probable motive of employers 
adopting mediation is avoiding the cost and publicity of litigation, and perhaps 
also improving workforce morale and thereby productivity. 155 Indeed, some 
evidence suggests that unionized workers, and particularly union activists, are 
more likely to assert statutory rights. 156 If that is the case, then a mediation 
program for statutory rights may be of particular benefit to unionized employers. 
Those employers who have utilized internal mediation or ombuds programs 
frequently report satisfactory results. 157 Disputes are resolved more quickly and 
RONALD L. SEEBER, THEAPPROPRIA TE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT 
ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 30 (1998). 
154. See Lipsky& Seeber,/n Search of Control, supra note 153, at 137, 153, 157; 
Margaret L. Shaw, Designing and Implementing In-House Dispute Resolution Programs, 
in ALl-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, ALTERNATNE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): How TO 
USE IT TO YouR ADV ANT AGE! ( 1999) (listing mediation programs of a number oflarge 
employers including McGraw-Hill, Halliburton (formerly Brown & Root), Polaroid, 
TRW and Shen Oil). 
155. In a survey of corporate counsel, cost and time savings were identified as the 
primary reasons for using mediation. Lipsky & Seeber, In Search of Control, supra note 
153, at 138. In addition, corporations were motivated to use mediation by the control it 
provided over resolution of the dispute, the satisfactory nature of the process and 
settlements reached, and the preservation of good relationships achieved from resolving 
disputes through mediation. Id. at 139. 
156. See Budd & Mccan, supra note 147, at 488, 490-91 (finding that union 
employees are more likely than nonunion employees to receive unemployment 
compensation benefits); Hirsch et al., supra note 147, at 218, 233 (finding that union 
employees are more likely to receive workers' compensation benefits); Michele Hoyman 
& Lamont Stanworth, Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 61, 77 (1986) (finding a correlation between union activism and filing of 
lawsuits); Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. Stanworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An 
Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 134-36 (finding 
that both union activism and grievance filing were positively associated with filing of 
lawsuits and discrimination charges); David Weil, Employee Rights, Unions and the 
Implementation of Labor Policies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL 
MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH Ass 'N 4 7 4, 4 7 6 ( 1993) (analyzing various 
studies and concluding that unions improve enforcement of various laws, including the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, OSHA, MSHA, certain provisions of ERISA, workers' 
compensation laws and unemployment compensation laws); Weil, supra note 14 7, at 26-
34 (finding that unions increase OSHA enforcement). 
157. See GAO REPORT,supra note 143, at 3 (reporting positive experiences with 
ADR by an five private employers and four of five federal agencies studied, with 
mediation proving most effective in resolving disputes); Colvin, supra note 150, at 27 
(describing management satisfaction with mediation program at TRW, which resolved 
disputes quickly and at low cost); Shaw, supra note 154 (reporting on Hughes Aircraft 
and Brown & Root multi-step dispute resolution programs where employee claims were 
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at lower cost. Resolution may be achieved before positions harden or actions are 
taken that make resolution more difficult. 158 Resolution can be based on interests 
rather than legal rights alone, potentially creating a long-term solution and 
avoiding recurring problems. 159 In addition, participants in mediation, including 
supervisors and managers, may improve their problem solving skills. As a 
consequence future disputes, including both contractual grievances and 
noncontractual disputes, may be reduced or resolved more quickly. 16° For these 
reasons, mediation has greater potential than arbitration or litigation for 
preserving the ongoing relationship of employer and employees. Since 
unionized workplaces generally have lower turnover than nonunion 
workplaces, 161 preserving relationships is particularly important for the 
productivity of the work force. Although the employer is providing a forum for 
disputes where none previously existed, the benefit of improved morale, greater 
productivity and more effective resolution of all disputes may outweigh the cost 
of providing the forum and spending employee, employer and union time on 
resolution. 162 
Furthermore, advocates of workplace dispute resolution programs point out 
that successful programs include input from stakeholders, such as employees, in 
resolved quickly to employees' satisfaction at early steps in the process, saving the 
employers legal fees); see also Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of Mediation: 
An Independent Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major Service Providers, 12 
NEGOTIATION J. 259 ( 1996) (finding that mediation settled seventy-eight percent of cases 
and was cheaper, quicker and more satisfactory to the parties than arbitration because of 
greater opportunities for voice and outcome control). 
158. See GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 4, 26; Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle 
Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases Is Too Little Too Late: An Organizational 
Conflict Management Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 264-
65 (1998) (noting that while mediation can resolve disputes after lawsuits or 
administrative charges are filed, earlier conflict resolution enhances the benefits of 
mediation for preserving relationships and preventing future conflict). 
159. Shaw, supra note 154 (reporting that Hughes Electronics Corporation saw the 
focus on underlying interests as a key to program success). 
160. See Jonathan F. Anderson & Lisa Bingham, Upstream Effects from Mediation 
of Workplace Disputes: Some Preliminary Evidence from the USPS, 48 LAB. L.J. 601, 
609-10 (1997); Goldberg, supra note 95, at 12-13. 
161. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?, at 20-21 
(1984). 
162. Shaw, supra note 154 (reporting that both Brown & Root and TRW noted 
that, contrary to expectations, their ADR programs did not result in excessive complaints 
or abuse by"chronic complainers"). Moreover, some disputes subject to mediation were 
probably filed in the grievance procedure previously, whether or not they fit the formal 
definition of a grievance. Thus, the mediation procedure may merely shift costs from one 
forum to another. 
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the system design. 163 The union provides a vehicle for such input, increasing the 
chances that the mediation system will achieve its goals. 
The EEOC has recently established a pilot program that allows employers 
with preapproved ADR programs the first opportunity to resolve discrimination 
complaints filed with the agency. 164 The ADR program must be well-
established, voluntary and free. 165 It must incorporate statutory claims subject 
to EEOC enforcement and include judicially enforceable written settlements. 166 
Under the program, the agency, at the option of the charging party, will give the 
parties sixty days to resolve the dispute using the existing internal program. A 
mediation program with union representation might appeal to the EEOC for 
inclusion in its new program. The employer could avoid the time and cost 
necessary to respond to the EEOC investigation if the complaint is settled 
internally. In addition, as the program's efficacy is established, employees might 
opt for mediation prior to filing an EEOC charge. 
If, as argued above, a mediation forum for noncontractual disputes offers 
potential for strengthening the union by including individuals who may feel 
estranged, the resulting increase in union power may suggest that employers 
should avoid such mediation. The countervailing advantage to the employer, 
however, is that mediation provides an opportunity to resolve issues relating to 
gender, race, and ethnicity that might ultimately lead to litigation. As noted 
above, even ifthe issues do not result in lawsuits against the employer, festering 
problems among the workers or between workers and supervisors may reduce 
morale and productivity. While employee dissatisfaction with the union may 
ultimately redound to the employer's benefit in some cases, often it will cause 
difficulties for the employer as well as the union. It may be difficult for the 
union to resolve matters with the employer if the union is faced with revolt in 
employee ranks, even where the dissatisfied are merely a vocal minority of 
163. Gourlay & Soderquist, supra note 158, at 278; Rowe, supra note 135, at 85; 
Sylvia Skratek, Conflictive Partnerships Under Collective Bargaining: A Neutral 's 
Perspective, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 42, at 57, 70 (urging 
meetings with unions and employers early in design process); John W. Zinsser, 
Employment Dispute Resolution Systems: Experience Grows but Some Questions 
Persist, 12 NEGOTIATION J. 151, 162 (1992) (describing Brown & Root's dispute 
resolution system and noting the importance of involving employees in system design 
early in the process); FMCS Exploring Dispute Systems Design to Meet Emergent 
Workplace Conflicts, 41 Gov 't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BN A) No. 2026 (Sept. 23, 2003) (noting 
that FMCS is working to bring workers and managers to the table to discuss system 
design because the parties must be involved in establishing a system that works in the 
organizational culture). 
164. EEOC Launches Pilot ADR Referral Program for Pre-Approved Employers 
in Philadelphia, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A-1 (Mar. 25, 2003). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
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employees. 167 Thus, the contractual grievance process may become saturated. 
Time spent on grievances or even informal griping is time not spent on 
production. The union may be forced to arbitrate more grievances. And where 
the union fails to do so, legal actions against both the employer and the union 
may result. Thus, the employer should carefully consider whether disruption in 
the relationship between the workers and the union truly advantages the 
employer. In fact, a mechanism for resolution of such disputes may benefit the 
employer as well as the union. 
4. Empirical Evidence 
One significant example of the use of mediation to resolve noncontractual 
claims in the unionized workplace is the system adopted at the United States 
Postal Service, one of the largest unionized employers in the country.168 The 
mediation program, known as REDRESS, offers voluntary mediation of 
employment discrimination disputes. 169 The program uses "transformative 
mediation," which has a goal of transforming individuals by assisting them in 
dealing with conflict. 170 Transformative mediation seeks to promote parties' 
control over their own dispute and to empower them to make decisions. 171 It also 
encourages each party to mediation to recognize the needs and interests of the 
other party. 172 Research indicates participant satisfaction with both the process 
and the outcome. 173 In addition, the conflict management skills of supervisors 
participating in mediation have improved. 174 Evidence from preliminary studies 
167. Of course, ifa majority of employees are dissatisfied, it is likely that either the 
union leadership will be defeated in the legally required elections or the union will be 
decertified as the employees' representative at the next available opportunity. 
168. Lisa B. Bingham, Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment 
Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 341, 355-56 (2002). Although 
it is a public employer, the Postal Service is covered by the National Labor Relations Act. 
See 39 U.S.C. § § 1202-1203, 1208-1209 (2000). In 2002, 72.5 percent of Postal Service 
employees were covered by collective bargaining agreements. BARRY T. HIRSCH & 
DAVID MACPHERSON, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS DATA BOOK: COMPILATIONS 
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 17 (2002). The mediation system is available 
to all employees, including supervisors and managers who do not have the right to 
unionize but may belong to associations which provide representational services in 
mediation. Bingham, supra, at 358. 
169. Bingham, supra note 168, at 355. 
170. Id. at 356. 
171. Id. at 356-57. 
172. Anderson & Bingham, supra note 160, at 602. 
173. Bingham, supra note 168, at 357. 
174. Anderson & Bingham, supra note 160, at 607-09; Bingham, supra note 168, 
at 357. A much smaller percentage of employees also reported that mediation changed 
how they handled conflict. Anderson & Bingham, supra note 160, at 607. 
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established that a significant percentage of participants felt both empowerment 
and recognition by the other party. 175 Like the system recommended here, 
employees in the REDRESS program are permitted to choose their own 
representative, who may be a lawyer, coworker, union representative, friend, or 
family member. 176 
An analysis of the role of representation in the REDRESS process 
demonstrated that settlement was more likely when the complainant/employee 
was represented. 177 Researchers speculated that representation might balance 
power and thereby make settlement more likely.17s Representation of claimants 
also extended the length of mediation. 179 The parties settled most often when the 
complainant was represented by a union representative and least often when the 
complainant's representative was an attorney. 1so 
Both complainants and respondents reported high levels of satisfaction with 
the fairness of the REDRESS mediation process. 1s1 Ninety-one percent of 
complainants represented by union representatives reported being very satisfied 
175. Anderson & Bingham, supra note 160, at 609-10. 
176. Bingham, supra note 168, at 358. 
177. Id. at 361. The data did not distinguish between types ofrepresentatives. Id. 
178. Id. at 362. Mediation theorists argue that equality of power makes settlement 
more likely. Id. It is possible, however, that the types of cases in which the parties chose 
to bring representatives were different, affecting the settlement rate. Id. 
179. Id. at 363. The range between the longest and shortest mediation sessions was 
only forty-seven minutes, however. Id. 
180. Id. at 365-66. The data does not reveal whether the settlement was 
substantively positive from the employee's point of view. Id. Association 
representatives for supervisors and managers also made settlement more likely. Id. 
Unlike attorneys for complainants, however, attorney representation for supervisors and 
managers did not render settlement least likely (as compared to no representation or 
representation by another person such as a family member or friend). Id. at 366. 
Researchers speculated that the specialized knowledge and experience of the Postal 
Service attorneys might contribute to settlement or that the type of case in which the 
employer deemed such representation necessary might be different. Id. In another study 
of representation in mediation, the researchers found that attorney representation in 
mediation was not correlated with greater satisfaction with mediation. Varma & 
Stallworth, supra note 132, at 402-03, 413. In fact, those represented by attorneys were 
generally less satisfied, except with the mediation process itself. Id. at 402-03, 413, 415. 
The study, which contained only forty-seven participants, looked only at attorney 
representation, not representation by nonlawyers, and contained responses from both 
charging parties and respondents. Id. at 397. The authors suggest that the lower 
satisfaction rate may be explained by tension between participants and their attorneys. 
Id. at 413-14. 
181. Bingham, supra note 168, at 367-68. Ninety percent of complainants and 
ninety-three percent of respondents were either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied. Id. 
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or somewhat satisfied with the fairness of the process. 182 An equal percentage 
of employees without representation reported satisfaction, with a slightly higher 
percentage indicating they were very satisfied with the fairness of the process. 183 
Not surprisingly, complainants were most satisfied with their own participation 
level in mediation where they had no representative, but only slightly less 
satisfied with their own participation when represented by the union. 184 
The majority of the issues mediated in the REDRESS program involved 
parties in ongoing relationships rather than employment terminations. 185 Most 
of the settlements were noneconomic and they frequently involved apologies and 
agreements to modify communication methods in the future. 186 Researchers 
suggested that attorneys might be associated with a lower settlement rate due to 
their desire to "create a cash pool from which to recover attorneys' fees." 187 
They surmised that union officials' status as repeat players with experience 
dealing with management might explain their higher settlement rate. 188 
Alternatively, it is possible that complainants used attorneys in cases that were 
"stronger on the merits, more contentious and complex" and correspondingly 
less likely to settle in mediation. 189 
The REDRESS program is the closest program to that suggested here that 
has been subjected to research and analysis. While there is more research to be 
done, the preliminary results suggest positive effects from union representation 
in internal EEO mediation for both the employee and the employer. 190 As noted 
182. Id. at 368-69. Seventy-six percent of those represented by attorneys reported 
similar satisfaction. Id. 
183. Id. For respondents the satisfaction level was highest with attorney 
representation (ninety-five percent) and only slightly lower with association 
representation (ninety-four percent) or no representation (ninety-four percent). Id. 
184. Ninety-seven percent of employees reported being very satisfied or somewhat 
satisfied with their own participation level when they represented themselves, while 
ninety-six percent indicated similar satisfaction levels with union representation. Id. at 
371. With a lawyer, the satisfaction level was ninety-two percent. Id. 
185. Id. at 372. But see Colvin, supra note 150, at 27 (describing successful 
mediation program at TRW, which included cases oflayoff and wrongful discharge, and 
noting that reinstatement of employees was a part of the settlement in some cases). 
186. Bingham, supra note 168, at 372-73. The TRW mediation program also 
included a number of non-monetary remedies including reinstatement of discharged 
employees, changes in application of policies, and employee transfers within the 
company. Colvin, supra note 150, at 27. 
187. Bingham, supra note 168, at 372. In Professor Ellen Dannin's study of 
mediation in New Zealand, she found that increasing use oflawyers also added to delay 
in the mediation process. See Ellen J. Dannin, Contracting Mediation: The Impact of 
Different Statutory Regimes, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 65, 105, 108 (1999). 
188. Bingham, supra note 168, at 372. 
189. Id. at 375. 
190. Id. at 376-77. 
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above, empirical research on grievance mediation also indicates high settlement 
rates and high party satisfaction rates, as well as improved ability to resolve 
future disputes. 191 
Research on civil legal mediation suggests some caution in optimism about 
mediation's ability to repair relationships, however. Professor Dwight Golann 
surveyed mediators to determine how frequently such repairs occurred, limiting 
his survey to cases where the parties had a prior relationship and a legal claim 
had been either filed or threatened. 192 A relationship repair was effectuated in 
only seventeen percent of the cases. 193 In thirty percent of the cases, the 
settlement included at least one noneconomic term. 194 Given that repair of 
relationships and interest-based settlement are two touted values of mediation, 
one might have expected a higher rate of both. While this is a relatively low rate 
of repair, it is interesting to note that Professor Golann excluded mediation in 
unionized workplaces because he believed that the incentive to repair 
relationships would be significantly greater there than in other civil disputes and 
inclusion might bias the results. 195 
While no empirical test of the factors that influence repair of relationships 
was incorporated in the study, the survey asked the mediators what factors 
affected the possibility of relationship repair. 196 The four factors mentioned were 
the value of the renewed relationship as compared to litigation or separation, the 
timing of mediation in the progress of the dispute, the attitudes of the parties and 
their representatives, and whether the mediator had a chance to begin to prepare 
the parties for a possible repair before the actual mediation session. 197 The 
REDRESS program is an example of a mediation where relationship repairs 
191. See Elkiss, supra note 90, at 677-80; Feuille, supra note 5, at 190-92; 
Goldberg & Brett, supra note 91, at 26, 27, 28; Skratek,supra note 163, at 63-65; supra 
notes 93-96 and accompanying text. The high settlement rate in grievance mediation is 
particularly impressive given that it is a later step in the grievance process. It is probable 
that cases where settlement could be reached easily were resolved in the earlier steps of 
the grievance procedure. 
192. Dwight Golann, Is Legal Mediation a Process of Repair-Or Separation? An 
Empirical Study, and its Implications, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 301, 303-06 (2002). 
193. Id. at 311. A repair was defined as a plan for an ongoing relationship. Id. at 
313. In seven cases, the mediator believed there had been a reconciliation, a willingness 
to continue to relate voluntarily, which included situations where there was no specific 
plan for future relations. Id. at 313-14. 
194. Id. at 314. Confidentiality clauses and liability releases were not considered 
noneconomic terms. Id. at 308-09. Noneconomic terms in employment cases included 
a letter of reference, a change in the employment file, an apology, a noncompetition 
agreement, and an agreement not to reapply for employment. Id. at 315. 
195. Id. at 320. 
196. Id. at 318. 
197. Id. 
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were more likely because the employees viewed the postal service as their 
lifetime career, thus providing an incentive to negotiate a satisfactory resolution 
that allowed parties to continue to work together. 198 
In the family law area, the collaborative law movement suggests that 
mediation outside the context of litigation can preserve relationships. 199 
Collaborative lawyers agree to represent clients only for purposes of settlement 
discussion, eschewing litigation. 200 If litigation occurs, the lawyer must 
withdraw and his or her firm cannot participate in the litigation. 201 Collaborative 
lawyers have formed networks around the country and report anecdotally that 
settlement in many cases comes more quickly, cheaply and with less rancor, both 
in settlement discussions and subsequently.202 While evidence of use of 
collaborative law in employment is rare, the importance of ongoing relationships 
has resulted in recommendations that expansion of the movement into the 
employment law field might be appropriate.203 
In addition to the literature on mediation, the empirical evidence from the 
REDRESS program, as well as grievance mediation, suggests that a mediation 
program for noncontractual disputes in the union workplace may provide 
benefits to all parties. The two programs use two different models of mediation. 
The section below analyzes the two models to determine which might be most 
suited to noncontractual disputes. 
198. Id. at 320. 
199. Elaine McArdle, Divorce Without the Bloodshed, LA WYERS WEEKLY USA, 
Apr. 3, 2000, available athttp://www.Jawyersweeklyusa.com/reprints/collaborative.htm. 
200. James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in 
Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 431, 432 (2002). Critics suggest that 
a collaborative Jaw attorney might have an incentive to encourage a Jess desirable 
settlement to avoid failure of the process, and consequent inability to obtain fees. Id. at 
433. 
20 I. Id. at 433-34. 
202. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 432 (describing Collaborative Law Center 
in Cincinnati, Ohio, and suggesting that collaborative lawyering helps maintain 
relationships); McArdle,supranote 199; The Advocates Network, A Collaborative Law 
Network oflndependent Professionals, athttp://www.advocatesnetwork.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2004); Collaborative Law Section, athttp://www.mediate.com/collaborativelaw 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (archiving and summarizing various articles on collaborative 
Jaw); Hamline University School of Law Dispute Resolution Institute, Collaborative Law 
Section, at http://www.hamline.edu/law/adr (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (archiving and 
summarizing various articles on collaborative law); Massachusetts Collaborative Law 
Council, at http://www.massclc.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (describing benefits of 
collaborative Jaw and identifying attorneys practicing in the field). 
203. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 433; Massachusetts Collaborative Law 
Council, supra note 202, at http://www.massclc.org/employment.htm. 
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D. Choosing the Type of Mediation 
1. Transfonnative Versus Transactional Mediation 
There is widespread agreement among mediation scholars that at least two 
different types of mediation exist. While denomination of the two types varies, 
one type may be described as transactional and the other as transformative.204 
Broadly described, the goal of transactional mediation is settlement. 205 In 
transactional mediation, the mediator facilitates discussion of the issues and 
assists the parties in their efforts to resolve their dispute. Many scholars also 
divide transactional mediation into two types. In one form, most often used for 
rights-based disputes, the mediator's evaluation of how the dispute might be 
decided in court or arbitration is an important component.206 The mediator 
typically is chosen for subject matter expertise. The other form of transactional 
mediation eschews evaluation, instead focusing on interest-based negotiation 
techniques to facilitate settlement. The mediator tries to encourage 
communication between the parties to enable the parties to craft their own 
settlement. This form of mediation has been denominated "facilitative" or 
"process-oriented. "207 
In transformative mediation, pioneered by Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph 
Folger, the primary goals are empowerment of the parties and recognition by 
each party of the other's concerns.208 To empower the parties, the mediator 
204. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Handling Workplace Conflict: Why Transformative 
Mediation?, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 368, 368 n.4 (2001). 
205. The following general description of the two types of mediation is derived 
from EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
THE ADVOCATE'$ PERSPECTIVE 188-92 (2d ed. 2001), Lisa B. Bingham & Lisa-Marie 
Napoli, Employment Dispute Resolution and Workplace Culture: The REDRESS 
Program at the United States Postal Service, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION DESKBOOK, supra note 108, at 507, 519-24, and Bush, supra note 204, at 
368-70. 
206. This form of mediation might be called "evaluative," Bingham & Napoli, 
supra note 205, at 519, "substance-oriented," BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 205, at 
193-94, or "information centered," Norman Brand, Learning to Use the Mediation 
Process-A Guide for Lawyers, ARB. J., Dec. 1992, at6, 8-12. 
207. See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 205, at 195-97 (describing "process-
oriented" mediation); Bingham & Napoli, supra note 205, at 519 (describing mediation 
without an evaluative component or mediation where the evaluation comes only at the 
end of the process of interest-based negotiation, as "facilitative"). Norman Brand calls 
this types of transactional mediation "process centered mediation." Brand, supra note 
206, at 8-12. In process-oriented mediation, the mediator is chosen for expertise in 
dispute resolution. Id. 
208. Bush and Folger introduced transformative mediation in the 1994 book, The 
Promise of Mediation. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF 
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allows the parties to control the process by setting their own ground rules, 
proffering their concerns, and making their own decisions. The mediator's 
primary role is to ask questions to ensure comfort, control, and adequate 
resources, and to make comments, helping the parties see when recognition of 
the other parties' concerns has occurred. One of the long-term goals of 
transformative mediation is to assist the parties in improving their ability to 
resolve future disputes, thereby changing organizational culture. Settlement is 
a common byproduct, but not the primary goal, of transformative mediation. 
Of the two examples of workplace mediation discussed earlier, one, the 
REDRESS program, uses transformative mediation, while grievance mediation 
is commonly transactional or settlement-oriented.209 The REDRESS program 
chose the transformative model in a deliberate effort to change the workplace 
culture.210 Early evaluations suggest that the parties to mediation, supervisors 
and employees alike, believe that they are better able to resolve conflicts as a 
result of their participation in mediation.211 In addition, both the number of 
informal complaints and the number of disputes proceeding to the formal 
complaint stage have been reduced.212 Although settlement is not an explicit 
goal, full or partial settlement is reached in sixty-three to sixty-four percent of 
cases mediated. 213 Eighty percent of cases are closed, which includes settlement 
during or after mediation, cases where the complainant withdrew the complaint, 
and those where the complainant did not proceed to the next step of the 
process.214 Employees and supervisors report high levels of satisfaction with the 
process (ninety percent), and relatively high levels of satisfaction with the 
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT TuROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 
(1994). Brunet and Craver call transfonnative mediation ''relationship-oriented" 
mediation. BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 205, at 190-92. Earlier, Raymond Shonholtz 
utilized a similar type of mediation with empowerment as the primary goal in his work 
with neighborhood justice systems. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 348 (I 985); Raymond Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, 
Structure, and Guiding Principles, 5 MEDIATION Q. 3, 10-11, 13-16 (1984),reprinted in 
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra, at 364-67. 
209. Grievance mediation uses an evaluation, but only late in the process, after 
initial settlement efforts have failed. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
210. Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 378. 
211. Id. at 377, 380; Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative Mediation 
in the USPS REDRESS & TM Program: Observations of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399, 402 (2001). 
212. Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 380. Under the complaint procedure, formal 
complaints are filed when the complaint is not resolved at the informal stage. Id. Formal 
complaints require investigation and may lead to trial. Id. 
213. Bingham, supra note 168, at 364. 
214. Id. at 364-65. 
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outcomes (sixty-five to seventy percent). 215 The Postal Service has trained about 
three thousand mediators around the country in the transformative mediation 
process,216 creating a group of mediators that would also be available for other 
transformative mediation programs. 
Because of the reported success of the REDRESS program, which seeks to 
mediate noncontractual disputes in a unionized environment, it provides an 
appealing model. The Postal Service is in some ways a unique environment, 
however. It is one of the largest civilian employers in the world.217 The number 
of EEO complaints was about fourteen thousand per year before the REDRESS 
program was implemented.218 The very size of the organization and the number 
of EEO cases could justify a substantial investment in a mediation program. 
Moreover, although it operates as a "serniprivatized independent establishment 
of the executive branch,"219 the level of job security is higher than most private 
businesses and most employees expect to spend their career with the postal 
service. 220 Thus, both management and employees are likely to view as 
worthwhile the investment in transforming culture and repairing relationships. 
Transactional mediation is most often used in grievance mediation,221 
although the parties to such mediations, the union and the employer, will have 
an ongoing relationship governed by the collective bargaining agreement. 
Grievance mediations involve contractual rights under the collective bargaining 
agreement, although the mediation may reveal underlying interests that are the 
real source of the problem.222 The genius of mediation is the ability to focus on 
such interests. Similarly, many of the disputes in the REDRESS program were 
phrased in terms of rights, primarily EEO issues. Yet in the transformative 
mediation process, the resolution often focused not so much on rights, but on 
interests.223 Both the REDRESS program and grievance mediation programs 
show some evidence of changing workplace culture and improving the ability of 
215. Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 380. 
216. Gann & Hallberlin, supra note 108, at 627. 
217. Nabatchi & Bingham, supra note 211, at 403. 
218. Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 380. 
219. Bingham & Napoli, supra note 205, at 510. 
220. Golann, supra note 192, at 320. 
221. Peter Feuille, Dispute Resolution Frontiers in the Unionized Workplace, in 
WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 42, at 17, 36; Skratek, supra note 163, at 
64. 
222. Goldberg, supra note 95, at 10-11. 
223. See James R. Antes et al., Transforming Conflict Interactions in the 
Workplace: Documented Effects of the USPS REDRESS TM Program, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 429, 435-52 (2001) (summarizing sixteen REDRESS mediations). As 
proposed here, the mediation program would include not only legal issues, but also 
disputes that involved neither contractual nor legal rights. Such disputes necessarily 
focus on interests. 
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the parties to resolve their own disputes. 224 Perhaps either system would achieve 
positive results in the unionized environment. A further look at these two forms 
of mediation in relation to the advantages of the mediation program discussed 
above may shed more light on the choice of mediation format. 225 
For the employer, the primary advantages were resolution of disputes that 
might otherwise be litigated and improvements in the ability of supervisors and 
employees to resolve disputes without formal processes. These benefits accrue 
to the employees and the union as well. Evidence from the REDRESS program 
demonstrates high settlement rates from use of the transformative model, 
although settlement is not the primary goal.226 In addition, there is evidence of 
improvement in the parties' ability to resolve disputes. 227 Grievance mediation, 
with its evaluative component, also has a high settlement rate228 and evidence 
224. See supra notes 94-96, 173-75, 211-12 and accompanying text. 
225. Most of the focus will be on the REDRESS program and grievance mediation 
because they resemble most closely the program recommended here. The presence of the 
union generally creates a more stable workforce because ofbenefits like seniority and job 
security. Employees who have protection from termination without just cause are more 
likely to file complaints while still employed. The upstream benefits, like relationship 
preservation and repair and improvement in dispute resolution skills, will be more 
important in a stable workforce. Nevertheless, some data from mediation in the nonunion 
workplace will be reviewed also. 
226. See Bingham & Pitts, supra note 108, at 143-44 (citing research findings that 
"implementation of REDRESS corresponded to a statistically significant drop in formal 
EEO complaints of more than seventeen percent annually''); Successes of Employment 
Resolution Through Mediation Discussed at ABA Meeting, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 
85, at A-4 (May 2, 2001) (citing REDRESS program closure rates of seventy-eight 
percent in 2000 and eighty percent in 2001, and a twenty-eight percent decrease in cases 
filed between fiscal years 1998 and 2001 ); supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. 
A small pilot study of mediation in several state agencies in Ohio also found a high 
resolution rate for cases that went to mediation. See Hebert, supra note 107, at 434 
(reporting eight ofnine mediated disputes resolved). The mediated cases were primarily 
EEO disputes and interpersonal conflicts. Id. at 426-27. The study did not specifically 
report whether the mediation format was evaluative or facilitative and reports of mediator 
behaviors were conflicting, although there were some reports of evaluative conduct. See 
id. at 433. Some employees apparently were unionized but no information regarding the 
role of the union was reported, except that efforts were made to educate the union about 
mediation and there were some indications that the union was supportive. Id. at 425, 
427, 429. The small sample limits the ability to generalize from the study, however. Id. 
at446. 
227. See Successes of Employment Resolution, supra note 226 (citing twenty-eight 
percent decrease in cases filed at Postal Service between fiscal years 1998 and 2001); 
supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. 
228. See Goldberg, supra note 95, at 12 (citing settlement rates both inside and 
outside the coal industry of approximately eighty percent); supra note 96 and 
accompanying text. 
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shows later benefits in problem solving ability.229 As noted above, although 
limited evidence regarding mediation of legal claims suggests that repair of 
relationships rarely results,230 the study excluded mediation in unionized 
workplaces. The ongoing relationship of the union and the employer can provide 
both incentive and ability to repair relationships. 
Evaluations of employer mediation programs also reveal high settlement 
rates.231 Additionally, a survey of private employers about ADR use indicated 
that many choose mediation because it preserves good relationships. 232 Several 
employers have indicated that dispute resolution programs improved 
management and supervision. 233 While governmental discrimination agency 
programs do not collect data on post-mediation relationships, they, like employer 
programs, have achieved substantial settlement rates. In the EEOC's pilot 
mediation program, the settlement rate was fifty-two percent.234 A later 
evaluation of the EEOC's program based on a survey of mediation participants 
showed that the cases of fifty-six percent of charging parties and sixty-one 
percent of respondents had been resolved at the time of response.235 The 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination's mediation program for 
civil rights cases resolved sixty-three percent of mediated cases.236 
229. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
230. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
231. See GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 3 (reporting that mediation had high 
settlement rates in nine of ten employer programs studied); Colvin, supra note 150, at 26-
2 7 (describing AD R program at TRW, where only three of seventy-two mediated claims 
in the first three years of the program went to arbitration, all others being either settled 
or dropped during or after mediation); Homer C. La Rue, The Changing Workplace 
Environment in the New Millennium: ADR is a Dominant Trend in the Workplace, 2000 
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 453, 499 n.58 (describing seventy percent settlement rate of cases 
in mediation at United Parcel Service); see also Shaw, supra note 154 (reporting on high 
resolution rates in the pre-hearing stages of dispute resolution programs at Hughes 
Aircraft and Brown & Root). 
232. LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 153, at 18. 
233. GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at45,48, 56; Colvin, supra note 150, at28-29 
(indicating that quicker resolution of disputes resulting from mediation enabled the 
employer to identify and remedy management problems more quickly, preventing further 
harm to the company). 
234. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 110. 
235. Id. ch. 6. Twenty-six percent of charging parties and nineteen percent of 
respondents had not completed their mediation at the time of the survey, however. Id. 
236. Thomas A. Kochan et al., An Evaluation of the Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 233, 257 (2000). Only twenty-one percent of comparison cases settled, but 
researchers urged caution in interpreting this comparison because some of the 
comparison cases remained at early stages. Id. at 257-58. 
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Improved employee morale is another benefit. While the evaluations of 
mediation do not measure this directly, satisfaction with mediation is likely to be 
a good proxy. The REDRESS transformative mediation program showed that 
all participants had high levels of satisfaction with the process and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, with the outcome. 237 Grievance mediation in the coal 
industry also resulted in high satisfaction levels, but the grievants were less 
satisfied than the company and the union. 238 Data from governmental agency 
mediation programs also indicate relatively high satisfaction levels. 239 Although 
not definitive, this data may suggest that the transformative model better 
achieves the goal of employee morale. Also, some studies suggest that parties 
in legal or court-connected mediation are less satisfied with the fairness of the 
process and do not perceive themselves as having significant control over the 
mediation.240 The use of evaluative mediation may exacerbate this feeling of 
lack of control because of the pressure that disclosure of legal norms may place 
on the parties for a particular settlement.241 Professor Welsh, however, argues 
that it is not evaluative mediation per se that causes this feeling of lack of 
control. 242 Rather, she argues that it is the timing and presentation of the 
mediator's evaluation that causes dissatisfaction.243 An evaluation that comes 
later in the mediation process, following the pattern of grievance mediation, can 
address this concern. 
237. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. The Ohio study, although small, 
also revealed high satisfaction rates. Hebert, supra note 107, at 434-36. 
238. Feuille, supra note 5, at 190; Goldberg, supra note 95, at 12-13. The 
grievants were more satisfied with mediation than arbitration, however. Goldberg, supra 
note 95, at 13. For further discussion of grievant satisfaction, see infra note 247. 
239. See McDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 110, ch. 6 (describing participant 
satisfaction with EEOC mediation). Like participants in the REDRESS program, EEOC 
mediation participants were somewhat more satisfied with the process than the outcome. 
Id. The EEOC pilot program evaluation reported similar satisfaction levels. Id. ch. 2. 
Outsiders have described the EEOC mediation process as facilitative. See Yelnosky, 
supra note 116, at 602. Participants in the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination ("MCAD") mediation program also had relatively high satisfaction levels, 
but again, they were higher for process than outcome. Kochan et al., supra note 236, at 
264-65, 274. The MCAD mediation procedure is described as a combination of 
facilitative and directive. Id. at 274. Employers report employee satisfaction with 
internal programs but such reports are largely anecdotal or the result of company surveys, 
rather then systematic evaluation by neutral evaluators. See GAO REPORT, supra note 
143,at40,48,50-5l,59, 71, 75, 79. 
240. Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected 
Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DJSP. RESOL. 179, 
181-84. 
241. Welsh, supra note 144, at 847. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 848-5 l. 
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Another benefit of mediation is the opportunity for interest-based, rather 
than purely rights-based, solutions. Related to this possibility is the greater 
potential for resolving second-generation discrimination issues. Either form of 
mediation has the potential to generate agreements based on interests.244 If 
transactional mediation includes an evaluative component, however, and the 
mediator is overly focused on the legal norms and potential legal remedies or 
moves to the evaluation too quickly, exploration of interest-based solutions is 
likely to be short-circuited. Excessive pressure to mediate and resolve disputes 
quickly might lead to such tactics. 
A primary benefit cited above for incorporating noncontractual mediation 
is the empowerment and inclusion of union members and connections with 
outside social justice organizations.245 Transformative mediation, with its 
explicit goal of giving voice and empowerment to the parties and changing 
conflictive culture, may best achieve this benefit. Nevertheless, the studies of 
grievance mediation show that a carefully structured form of transactional 
mediation does not preclude this benefit in a workplace where the relationships 
are generally expected to be ongoing. 246 In legal or court-connected mediation, 
where studies have shown that the parties feel less empowered and relationship 
repairs are rare, the relationship was probably broken, perhaps irretrievably so, 
before the lawsuit was filed. The explicit goal of such mediation is to settle the 
case on terms based on legal rights to avoid trial. Docket clearing is an 
important goal of the court, and legal norms will generally be the driving factor 
in settlement. Even in grievance mediation, however, the individual grievants 
demonstrated somewhat less satisfaction than union and management officials.247 
244. See Bingham & Napoli, supra note 205, at 519 (describing the transfonnative 
model as focusing on "interest-based negotiation techniques to help the parties engage 
in creative problem solving regarding their conflict"); Goldberg & Brett, supra note 91, 
at 23-24 (describing the focus on interests as one of the benefits of the grievance 
mediation system which has an evaluative component); William L. Ury et al., Designing 
an Effective Dispute Resolution System, 4 NEGOTIATION J. 413, 415 (1988) (discussing 
the importance of focusing on interests in resolving disputes through mediation and 
negotiation). But see Yelnosky, supra note 116, at 600-02 (suggesting that facilitative 
mediation is better-suited to fashioning solutions to discrimination because it relieves the 
parties of the need to fit issues into Title VII doctrine). 
245. The small Ohio study found no difference in satisfaction with mediation 
among various racial and ethnic groups or between the genders. Hebert, supra note 107, 
at 435-36. 
246. Elkiss, supra note 90, at 678-79; Skratek, supra note 163, at 65. 
247. Employee satisfaction is more likely to be influenced by the outcome of the 
mediation since employees are one-shot players in the grievance process, while union and 
employer officials, who have a better sense of the merits of the grievance based on their 
experience, are likely to assess satisfaction based on the overall process rather than the 
outcome of a particular dispute. Jeanne M. Brett & Stephen B. Goldberg, Grievance 
Mediation in the Coal Industry: A Field Experiment, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 49, 63-
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Reduced employee satisfaction may be a natural result in a system where the 
union, not the employee, controls the decision about settlement. In the mediation 
suggested here, the union should be careful not to exert control, except to the 
extent of ensuring that settlement does not conflict with the collective bargaining 
agreement. The goal of empowering and including union members and their 
caucuses is paramount, and should not be sacrificed to the goal of settlement. 
Several other factors may be influential in the decision of which form of 
mediation to adopt. Where the dispute involves employees and supervisors still 
in the workforce, repair of relationships and transforming the manner of dealing 
with conflict will be important to employers, unions and employees. Where the 
dispute involves an employee or employees no longer employed, that goal may 
be less important.248 In the union workplace, however, it is far more common 
than in the nonunion workplace for employees to return to work after 
termination. Arbitrators frequently reinstate terminated employees. 249 And 
evidence demonstrates that in the union workplace, unlike the nonunion 
workplace, reinstatement often lasts.250 A mediated settlement may provide 
quicker reinstatement, easing the financial burden on both the employee and the 
employer, which would have a greater back pay obligation if the employee was 
reinstated after arbitration or litigation. Where there is clearly no desire to return 
or no possibility of return, empowerment of the employee and the caucus may 
still be a worthwhile goal from the union's point of view, as will education of the 
supervisor. The employer's incentive for transformative mediation under these 
circumstances may be limited, however. 
Finally, an evaluative model may quickly become ineffective where many 
of the disputes involve employees who have no meritorious legal claim. 
Evaluators of the REDRESS program noted that in ninety-five percent of 
64 (1983). 
248. If a supervisor or manager learns a better way to deal with other employees, 
however, mediation can provide value to the employer and those employees remaining 
in the workforce. 
249. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 300 (2000) (noting that 
reinstatement is the most common remedy for unjust discharge in labor arbitration). 
250. See WEILER, supra note 59, at 86 & n.72 (pointing out that seventy to eighty 
percent of reinstated employees in unionized workplaces continue to work for the 
employer "for an appreciable period," while reinstatement is far less successful where 
there is no union); Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful 
Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. I, 28-30, 38-39 (citing empirical studies establishing that 
in the unionized workplace over eighty-five percent of employees accepted arbitral 
awards of reinstatement and forty-seven to seventy-five percent of those were still 
working two years later; in two studies ofreinstatement under the NLRA only forty-one 
percerit and less than fifty percent of employees offered reinstatement accepted and of 
those only eleven percent and thirty percent respectively were still employed there after 
two years). 
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discrimination cases at the Postal Service, the evaluation would favor the 
employer.251 Given that the employer established and financed the program and 
trained the mediators, the authors posit that an evaluative program with such 
results would have the appearance of bias and thus be unsuccessful.252 It is 
unlikely that a smaller employer would be able to quantify the validity of 
discrimination claims as the Postal Service has done and thus tailor the mediation 
program based on the likely validity of claims. In the absence of evidence about 
the number of valid legal claims in the workplace, adoption of a mediation model 
without an evaluative component avoids this concern.253 Additionally, the 
REDRESS researchers suggest that mediators in an evaluative program might 
pressure the parties for settlement based on a belief that settlement is success, 
which again may have the appearance of bias.254 Where the goal is not 
settlement, these risks are diminished. 
To summarize, it appears that either transformative mediation or 
transactional mediation can achieve the benefits described above in the unionized 
workplace. 255 If transactional mediation is used, however, care must be taken to 
structure the mediation to avoid undue emphasis on the length of the sessions or 
the end result of settlement. In addition, if evaluation is used it should come 
after other efforts to settle have failed, in order to avoid unduly driving the 
discussions, limiting the options, and reducing empowerment and satisfaction. 
In some cases, an employer may have a greater interest in evaluative mediation 
since the primary benefit for the employer is settlement of legal claims without 
litigation. The employer should be aware of the potential for decreasing future 
disputes that may derive from transformative mediation, however. If an 
employer insists on a more directive form of mediation, it can still provide the 
necessary benefits to the union and employees if practiced as described above. 256 
251. Bingham & Napoli, supra note 205, at 523. 
252. Id. 
253. Interjecting evaluation only after other efforts to resolve the problem have 
failed, as in the grievance mediation model used by Goldberg and Brett, is another 
method of addressing this concern. 
254. Id. at 523-24. 
255. In a study of EEO mediation cases before the Kansas Human Rights 
Commission, researchers found that the participants in mediation believed that evaluative 
mediation was more effective than facilitative mediation in resolving workplace rights 
disputes. Vanna & Stallworth, supra note 132, at 412. The number of respondents to 
the survey was small (forty-seven), and it is not clear which type of mediation was used 
in the mediations in which the participants were involved. Id. at 397. The researchers 
hypothesize that facilitative mediation might be more appealing at earlier stages of the 
dispute before the parties have entered into the legal enforcement process, where they 
might be anticipating or seeking some judgment about the case. Id. at 412. 
256. In theory, there is no reason that the union and employer could not provide in 
their agreement that the form of mediation would be based on the type of dispute. Such 
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One option is for the parties to negotiate a trial or pilot program, both to 
determine whether the suggested benefits of the program are achieved and to 
evaluate which type of mediation will best fit their needs.257 A pilot program 
would require an evaluation and assessment to determine whether to extend the 
program. University dispute resolution programs or the Federal Mediation 
Conciliation Service ("FMCS") might provide such an assessment at reasonable 
cost.25s 
2. The Impact of Grievance Mediation 
Despite the widely reported success of grievance mediation programs, they 
are incorporated in a small percentage of collectively bargained grievance 
procedures.259 Professor Feuille has evaluated grievance mediation studies to 
determine the reasons for this limited adoption. A review of his conclusions may 
assist in determining whether mediation of legal claims has any future in the 
unionized workplace. In evaluating grievance mediation, Professor Feuille 
suggests that settlement in mediation is driven by the mediator's assessment of 
the strength of the grievance and that the cooperative attitudes of the parties to 
the process are a cause, rather than an effect, of mediation.260 Thus, Feuille 
argues that grievance mediation works because the parties who choose it are 
motivated to settle and because the mediator's evaluation of the merits of the 
grievance pressures the party predicted to lose in arbitration to accept a 
settlement.261 In essence, he contends that mediation offers little that is not 
already available in the existing grievance system except a preview of the 
arbitration decision. Feuille offers several explanations for the limited use of 
grievance mediation. First, he points out that most grievances are settled without 
arbitration, so that the additional mediation step is unnecessary.262 Second, he 
a system would work best if the parties agreed in advance which disputes would fall 
under which types of mediation and selected the mediator on that basis. Otherwise, the 
parties might have to resolve a dispute about the type of mediation before getting to the 
substance of the dispute, reducing the benefits of the system. 
257. Professor Dannin's research on two statutory mediation programs in New 
Zealand demonstrates that context is an important determinant of the success of a 
mediation system. See Dannin, supra note 187, at I 06. A pilot or experiment could aid 
the parties in determining the most effective program for their needs. 
258. See FMCS Exploring, supra note 163 (noting the FMCS initiative, Dynamic 
Adaptive Dispute Systems ("DY ADS"), formed to assist parties in design and assessment 
of dispute resolution systems for noncontractual disputes in the union and nonunion 
workplace). 
259. Feuille, supra note 5, at 197. 
260. Id. at 196-97. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 198. 
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posits that mediation resolves only carefully screened grievances and is 
dependent on the existence of arbitration and the mediator's prediction of its 
outcome.263 Because of these facts, mediation may be most appropriate for 
troubled relationships, and may be perceived as too limited in effect for the 
average grievance procedure. 264 Feuille also suggests that management has little 
incentive to agree to grievance mediation because almost all grievances are 
challenges to management action and thus, mediation provides an additional 
opportunity for the union to obtain something from the employer, often in 
grievances that the union does not intend to arbitrate.265 Finally, Professor 
Feuille posits that many unions and employers may prefer, or at least be more 
comfortable with, the adversarial relationships that commonly characterize the 
grievance procedure and arbitration.266 
Assuming that Feuille is correct, do these factors indicate that mediation 
outside the collective bargaining agreement will be similarly limited? The 
reported success of grievance mediation in some collective bargaining 
agreements and of the REDRESS program indicates that mediation may provide 
benefits for at least some unions, employers and employees. Unlike grievance 
mediation which is part of the existing grievance procedure, there is not another 
vehicle to achieve settlement for noncontractual claims.267 Thus, the mediation 
procedure advocated is not merely an additional, and perhaps superfluous, step 
in an already existing system. It offers something in addition that has benefits 
beyond settlement of the dispute. Further, even assuming that the union and the 
employer may prefer the adversarial system for their own contractual disputes, 
many employers are adopting mediation programs for legal disputes involving 
nonunion employees, suggesting that there are benefits to such programs.268 
Widespread management adoption of mediation procedures for nonunion 
263. Id. at 199-200. 
264. Id. at 200. 
265. Id. at 200-0 I. Knowing that the union can afford to arbitrate a limited number 
of grievances, management may prefer to force the union to undertake the costs of 
arbitration or drop the grievance. Id. at 203. 
266. Id. at 203-04. In addition, he suggests that mediation has no natural advocates 
because those who participate in arbitration benefit from its use and have little incentive 
to support a procedure that reduces arbitration. Id. at 204-05. 
267. It is possible that for the legal claims a court-connected procedure might exist, 
but it would not involve the union, unless it was a defendant, or identity caucuses. It is 
also possible that due to overlap between contractual and noncontractual claims, a 
noncontractual claim might be the subject of a contractual grievance. If, in fact, the 
overlap is such that most noncontractual disputes are resolved in the contractual 
grievance procedure, the mediation process advocated here would be superfluous. For 
further discussion of the overlap of claims, see infra Part 11.F. 
268. Feuille, supra note 5, at 205-07 (citing various studies showing frequent use 
of mediation to resolve disputes in the nonunion workplace). 
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employees indicates that employers are persuaded that they offer value to the 
company. 
If the success of grievance mediation in achieving settlement is dependent 
on the existence of arbitration and the arbitration preview, mediation of legal 
claims has a similar alternative, filing of a claim with an enforcement agency or 
court. The suggested importance of the preview in compelling settlement would 
argue for use of evaluative rather than transformative mediation, however. Also, 
the preview may be a far more important factor in settlement in a situation where 
experienced negotiators have already attempted and failed to settle the dispute 
in the earlier grievance process. In addition, the union or the employer may use 
the preview to explain to their constituencies a settlement that may be unpopular, 
in order to deflect political repercussions. The union, at least, has less need to 
be concerned about political ramifications in mediating claims where the claim 
belongs to the individual and the rights, if any, arise not from a union-negotiated 
contract, but from the law. Additional experiments with transformative, 
facilitative and evaluative mediation for noncontractual claims will provide 
further evidence as to the most appropriate format. The lack of widespread 
adoption of grievance mediation, however, does not indicate the mediation of 
noncontractual claims would not accomplish the purposes suggested here. 
Previous sections have identified potential benefits of mediation of 
noncontractual claims in the unionized workplace as well as some empirical 
research providing cautious optimism about the potential. Nevertheless, there 
are costs to providing such a program and a number of implementation issues 
that must be addressed in determining whether such a system would provide 
sufficient benefits to justify the costs to the parties. It is to these I now tum. 
E. Costs 
Negotiating a noncontractual mediation system would add some time and 
cost to collective bargaining negotiations. Such cost would be minimal, 
however, compared to the cost of establishing and administering the program and 
providing representation for employers and employees. 269 The cost of the 
program will be greater if outside mediators are used. 270 A mediation program 
269. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is planning to focus 
increasingly on employment mediation, which may assist employers and unions in 
reducing the cost of establishing a program. See FMCS Head Plans to Create Model, 
Increase Efforts in Nonbargaining Situations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at C-1 
(Mar. 24, 2002). The agency will create a roster of mediators for individual employment 
cases, and a mediation model and training programs to help employers implement 
internal mediation. Id. The agency can also direct parties to outside resources and help 
evaluate mediation systems. FMCS Exploring, supra note 163. 
270. If internal mediators are used, there is still a cost, however, as their time could 
otherwise be used for other work from which the employer derives benefit. 
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shared among several employers and/or unions, however, could reduce the 
administrative cost for each organization. Such a system might enable 
employees of one employer or union to mediate disputes involving different 
employers or unions, minimizing the cost of the mediator.271 Administration by 
a university or nonprofit organization could reduce costs also. 
To minimize any perception of bias, ideally the cost of the mediator should 
be shared by either the union and the employer or the aggrieved employee and 
the employer.272 Even ifthe full cost is not shared, payment of some fee by the 
employee, particularly for legal claims, increases investment in the process. 273 
Any fee may decrease participation, however, and thus the union and employer 
need to consider whether the process should be cost free to the employees. 274 
In addition to the cost of the mediation itself, there is the cost of training 
mediation advocates. 275 To successfully participate in mediation oflegal claims, 
271. Some government programs have utilized mediators from different agencies 
to reduce costs. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 61, 69, 77; Hebert, supra 
note 107, at 418-21; Hodges, supra note 108, at 489. Use of union or management 
personnel might diminish the perception of fairness, however. See supra note 108 and 
accompanying text. 
272. See Bingham, Employment Arbitration, supra note 32, at 215 (discussing the 
importance of the perception of fairness in dispute resolution). Scholars and courts, most 
debating in the context of arbitration, disagree about whether payment of the entire cost 
by one party will actually affect fairness of the process. See Matthew T. Ballenger, The 
Price of Justice: The Role of Cost A/location in the Employment Arbitration Fairness 
Analysis, 18 LAB. LA w. 485, 495-97 (2003). Because the union will have fewer financial 
resources in most cases, imposing substantial cost on the union may remove the 
incentive, or even the ability, to provide mediation for noncontractual claims. 
273. See Stuart H. Bompey & Gary R. Siniscalco, The Settlement Process in 
Employment Discrimination Litigation: A New Perspective, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CASES 31 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 
H-522, 1995) 
274. See CRAIG A. MCEWEN, AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION'S PILOT MEDIATION PROGRAM 28 (1994) (noting that 
payment of cost reduced participation in the program). The Postal Service paid the full 
cost of mediation and the mediator training costs for the REDRESS program, but it 
recovered some cost because each mediator was required to perform pro bono mediation 
as a condition of placement on the system's roster of mediators. Gann & Hallberlin, 
supra note 108, at 628. 
275. Training of advocates and, ideally, even potential disputants, is important to 
the success of the program. See GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 41 (reporting that 
Brown & Root found that "the effectiveness of a program is directly related to a 
company's investment in training and to its frequency of communication"); Elkiss, supra 
note 90, at 683 (emphasizing the importance of training advocates in mediation skills); 
Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 382 (discussing the importance of training to the success 
of REDRESS); Karen A. Intrater & Traci Gabhart Gann, The Lawyer's Role in 
Institutionalizing ADR, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 469, 470, 472-73, 474 (2001) 
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representatives should have training not only in negotiation and problem 
solving, 276 but also in the legal issues that will be mediated. Advocates should 
be able to assess the viability of legal claims in order to advise the parties as to 
equitable settlements. Even if the mediation itself does not contain an evaluative 
component,277 the acceptable settlement often will depend significantly on the 
likelihood of success in litigation. 278 If the mediation process is to be effective 
at improving the inclusiveness of the union, training for many potential 
advocates will be required. Given the limited resources of most unions, such 
training could be a substantial obstacle. 
In order to minimize the cost, unions must seek opportunities for low cost 
training from organizations such as universities, 279 nonprofit organizations280 and 
government agencies.281 Grants may be available for such training. The union 
could also negotiate for employer-paid training. If, in fact, mediation reduces 
litigation-related costs and improves productivity, employer investment in 
training would be cost-effective.282 Careful assessment of costs and benefits, use 
(describing training of Postal Service attorneys in the REDRESS Program and the 
establishment of a web site for complainants' attorneys); Ury et al., supra note 244, at 
418 (discussing necessity of training). 
276. Union representatives who have been involved in handling grievances under 
the collective bargaining agreement are often focused on gathering evidence, arguing 
rights and supporting positions. El kiss, supra note 90, at 686. While such skills will be 
useful in mediation of legal claims, the representatives also must be able to focus on 
interest-based problem solving, including creative thinking and effective communication, 
which furthers collaboration. Id. at 686-87. 
277. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (describing the grievance 
mediation process in which the mediator, who is also an experienced arbitrator, previews 
for the parties the predicted outcome of arbitration). 
278. Of course, the importance of this factor will depend on the issue being 
mediated and the goal of the mediation. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. 
279. For example, the Alliance for Education in Dispute Resolution is a consortium 
of academic institutions and professional organizations that provides training in dispute 
resolution. 
280. Union federations, such as AFL-CIO affiliates, could offer such training as 
well. 
28 l. The FMCS is considering implementation of a training program for 
employment mediation. See FMCS Head, supra note 269, at C- l. 
282. See GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 40-41 (reporting data from Brown & 
Root indicating substantial cost savings from ADR program despite costs of training and 
development, as well as payment of some legal fees for employees); Zinsser, supra note 
163, at 161 (reporting forty percent reduction in legal expenses at Brown & Root after 
implementation of dispute resolution program). An innovative method of funding the 
training necessary to spread a broad labor-management partnership throughout a large 
organization was adopted by Kaiser Permanente and a coalition of unions representing 
its employees. The parties established a trust fund for this purpose, financed in part by 
six cents per hour from employee wages, with an escalator clause for the later years of 
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of pilot projects, and location oflow cost sources of consultation, mediators and 
training will help employers and unions negotiate and implement cost-effective 
procedures designed for their particular needs. 
F. Overlap with the Other Procedures 
1. The Grievance Procedure 
Most collective bargaining agreements contain provisions that coincide 
with, or overlap with, legal requirements.283 Nondiscrimination provisions are 
incorporated in many collective bargaining agreements. 284 Family medical leave 
provisions are also common.285 Wages, hours, benefits, discipline and discharge 
are all covered by collective bargaining agreements, as well as statutory 
provisions and potential common law claims. 286 Given this overlap, why should 
the agreement. See Robert B. McKersie et al., Interest-Based Negotiations at Kaiser 
Permanente 11 (Apr. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
283. David E. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TwENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 97, 109 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 1976). 
284. According to a Bureau of National Affairs survey, sixty-eight percent of 
collective bargaining agreements in force in 2001 and expiring in 2002 contained a 
nondiscrimination provision and forty-eight percent contained a sexual harassment 
policy. 2002 SOURCE BOOK ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: w AGES, BENEFITS AND OTHER 
CONTRACT ISSUES 63 (2002). In addition, forty-one percent contained affirmative action 
programs and twenty-three percent contained diversity programs. Id. 
285. The BNA survey indicates that fifty-two percent of contracts contained a 
pledge to comply with the FMLA. Id. In addition, seventy-eight percent had provisions 
for sick leave and thirty-three percent contained provisions for personal leave. Id. at 55. 
In many situations the sick leave and personal leave provisions would overlap with 
FMLA leave. See also 29 U.S.C. § 2652 (2000) (addressing the effect of the FMLA on 
collective bargaining agreements, providing that the agreement cannot diminish statutory 
benefits but can add to them). 
286. Most contracts contain provisions on wages, job security, pensions, and health 
and life insurance. 2002 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 284, at 35-36, 41-42, 51-52, 59, 67-
68 (showing survey data on incorporation of such benefits in contracts). The Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service conducted a study for fiscal year 1997 to determine 
the breakdown of arbitration subjects. See COOPER ET AL., supra note 249, at 249. Of 
the cases "[f]ifty-six percent involved discipline and discharge, 19% wages and hours, 
10% seniority, 3% fringe benefits and 2% subcontracting." Id. Legal claims covering 
these same subjects are also available. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 207-
219 (2000) (minimum wage and overtime pay); the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-gg-2 (2000) (health insurance benefits); 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001- 1461 (2000) 
(pension and welfare benefit plans); CAL.LAB. CODE§§ 1171-1205 (West 1989 & Supp. 
2003) (wages and hours of work); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/1-15 (West 1999 & 
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the parties add another dispute resolution procedure instead of simply resolving 
all disputes through the existing collectively bargained grievance and arbitration 
procedure? 
Some unions and employers may effectively resolve all disputes through the 
grievance and arbitration procedure. In such cases, a separate mediation 
procedure might be unnecessary. Even in such situations, however, mediation 
of noncontractual claims often will provide an opportunity for more union 
involvement by groups who are often perceived, or perceive themselves, as 
outsiders. Where people of color and white women have not historically been 
active in the union, the union may not be meeting their needs effectively. 
Although union officials may view their current dispute resolution procedure as 
effective, that perception may not be shared by all, and the union should be 
cautious about quickly reaching such a conclusion. A separate mediation 
procedure that provides an opportunity to address issues such as discrimination, 
harassment, leave opportunities, child care and interpersonal disputes may 
enhance the union by making it more inclusive, while at the same time resolving 
disputes in ways that do not fit neatly under the collective bargaining agreement. 
Despite the frequent overlap between contractual and legal rights, unions 
often utilize the courts and administrative agencies to address legal issues, 287 and 
they direct employees to do so as well. 288 The rationales for doing so vary from 
a desire not to overload the grievance and arbitration procedure to a need to 
Supp. 2002)(same);MAss.ANN.LAWSch. 151, §§ l-22(Law. Co-op. l989)(same); VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-28.8-28.12 (Michie 2002) (same); Wrongful Discharge from 
Employment Act, MONT.CODEANN. §§ 39-2-901-915 (2001) (providingcauseofaction 
for wrongful termination); Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(recognizing employee's claim for intentional emotional distress for demotion and other 
demeaning treatment at work); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 
1989) (same); Muellerv. Union Pacific R.R., 371N.W.2d732 (Neb. 1985) (recognizing 
employee's claim for fraud). 
287. For examples of legal claims initiated by unions, see Int'I Union, UAW v. 
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (filing case against employer for sex 
discrimination); Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local 1 v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 839 
F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1988) (acting as plaintiff in sex discrimination case); Local Union 
1888 of the Am. Fed'n of State Employees v. City of Jackson, 473 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 
1973) (seeking declaratory judgment that defendants engaged in racial and sexual 
discrimination in employment practices); and Wilmington Firefighters Local 1590 v. City 
of Wilmington, 632 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Del. 1986) (suing city claiming discrimination 
against nonminority firefighters). See also Fisk, supra note 71, at 63 (noting the 
involvement of unions in enforcing statutory employment laws). 
288. See, e.g., Wright v. Universal Mar. Servs. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 74 (1998); 
Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F .3d 306, 307 (4th Cir. 2001 ); see also 0 'Melveny, supra 
note 123, at 354 (recommending that unions encourage employees to file complaints with 
the EEOC and state anti-discrimination agencies when employer does not address and 
resolve sexual harassment issues). 
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bring the power of the court or agency to bear in order to resolve the dispute.289 
While ultimately resolution by the courts may be required in some of these 
disputes, the mediation alternative provides a means for resolving the matter 
short oflitigation. To the extent that local union officials are uninterested in the 
issues, trained advocates from among the union membership can pursue the 
claim on behalf of the employee( s ), providing representation despite the official 
disinterest. 290 Some involvement from high level union officials will be 
necessary, however, to ensure that any settlement reached does not conflict with 
the collective bargaining agreement.291 In most cases, incompatibility will not 
be a problem. 292 Where there is potential for conflict-a broad structural change 
in procedures designed to remedy a dearth of women and/or minorities in a 
particular job classification, for example-the union can be involved in 
negotiating the necessary changes.293 
Unions and employers should carefully consider whether the grievance and 
arbitration procedure is effectively resolving both contractual and noncontractual 
disputes. If mediation is, in fact, duplicative of the grievance procedure, it may 
drain resources from the union and the employer that could be put to more 
productive use. Where noncontractual claims are not being resolved in the 
grievance and arbitration procedure, however, the mediation process can provide 
benefits to unions, employers and employees. The resources invested will be 
offset by settlement of claims, a more productive workforce, and, for the union 
and employees, a more active and involved membership that renders the union 
a better representative. In addition, the union may benefit from additional 
organizational successes that result from its ability to provide services to 
employees in nonunion workplaces. 
289. In some cases, the union officials may simply be unconvinced of the merits 
of the dispute or uninterested in the issues raised. A direction to the employee to utilize 
legal means is a method of"passing the buck" to avoid expending union resources. This 
may derive from a lack of sensitivity to the issues, for example, harassment or 
discrimination, which is one of the problems this proposal is designed to address. 
290. Pressure from international unions may encourage some local unions to 
negotiate mediation procedures even when local officials see little need to do so. 
291. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1983) 
(enforcing arbitration award under collective bargaining agreement despite its conflict 
with conciliation agreement negotiated by the EEOC and the employer to settle 
discrimination claim where union was not included in conciliation and employer and 
EEOC had no authority to abrogate the collective bargaining agreement). 
292. For example, most agreements have generic nondiscrimination clauses that 
would not be violated by any settlement. See infra notes 310-20 and accompanying text 
(discussing conflicting interests). 
293. Of course, where the union officials are resistant to such change, mediation 
may not resolve the dispute and legal action may be required. In some cases, legal action 
against the union may be included. 
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2. The Procedure for Harassment Complaints 
Recent Supreme Court decisions in sexual harassment cases have made 
creation of a complaint procedure for harassment a significant element of an 
employer's defense.294 In cases alleging a hostile environment, the employer 
may escape vicarious liability for the actions of its supervisors by establishing 
a two-pronged affirmative defense: 
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an 
anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in 
every instance as a matter oflaw, the need for a stated policy suitable 
to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in 
any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while 
proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of 
reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any 
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the 
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to 
satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the 
defense.295 
Where the alleged harassment was promulgated by a co-employee, employer 
liability depends on whether the employer took prompt and effective action to 
294. Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
295. El/erth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
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end the harassment once it knew or reasonably should have known of it. 296 This 
defense formulation also impels creation of an effective complaint procedure. 
While forcing mediation on a reluctant complainant would certainly be 
counterproductive, optional mediation can form a part of an effective complaint 
procedure. Evidence suggests that targets of sexual harassment most often 
simply want the harassment to stop.297 Most are not interested in litigation or 
damages, unless the employer is insensitive to the complaint. 298 Mediation offers 
several particular advantages over litigation of sexual harassment claims. 299 The 
296. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination, 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)(2003);seealso Swenson v. Potter, 271F.3d1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 
2001) (explaining that employer liability for coworker harassment arises when the 
employer "'knew or should have known about the conduct'" and failed to take "prompt 
corrective action that is 'reasonably calculated to end the harassment"') (quoting Ellerth, 
524 U.S. at 759; Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001)); 
Berry v. Delta Airlines, 260 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that an employer 
incurs liability for coworker harassment if it "'knew or should have known"' of the 
problem and failed to take "'appropriate remedial action"') (quoting McKenzie v. Ill. 
Dept. ofTransp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)); White v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 221 
F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that employer liability for coworker harassment is 
triggered ifthe employer "'knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment 
and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action"') (quoting 
Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 1997)); Mikels v. City 
of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that employers will be held liable 
for co-employee harassment for "failing, after actual or constructive knowledge, to take 
prompt and adequate action to stop it"); Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d 289, 
293-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that if an employer knew or should have known of the 
coworker harassment, it will be held liable for failing to take prompt and appropriate 
measures to stop the harassment). 
297. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra note 133 and accompa.:~:::;,; =~·.d. 
299. For a thorough discussion of advantages and disadvantages, see Jonathan R. 
Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in Resolving Sexual 
Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 156-63 (1999). See also Reginald 
Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Cases: A Representation Dilemma for Unions, 
2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 16 (1999) (suggesting multi-party mediation of sexual 
harassment disputes in the unionized workplace); Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of 
Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 
26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (2003) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of mediation 
of sexual harassment claims); Bond, supra note 133 (advocating mediation of sexual 
harassment disputes); Rajib Chanda, Student Article, Mediating University Sexual 
Assault Cases, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 265 (2001) (advocating a mediation option for 
sexual assault cases at universities). For a contrary view, see Mori Irvine, Mediation: 
Is It Appropriate for Sexual Harassment Grievances?, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27 
(1993) (rejecting mediation as an appropriate resolution forum for sexual harassment 
cases). Many, but not all, of the advantages and disadvantages discussed here would also 
apply to mediation of claims ofharassment on the basis of race, national origin, disability 
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confidentiality of mediation allows the parties to achieve resolution without the 
public revelation of what may be embarrassing details for both the victim and the 
harasser.Joo Early resolution of the dispute may avoid prolonging the trauma for 
the person harassed.Joi Where the harassment claim is the result of differential 
views about appropriate language and conduct, mediation can educate and lead 
to greater understanding. Joi Finally, mediation has the potential to empower the 
target, who has more control over the process and the outcome than in 
litigation. JoJ 
Some sexual harassment cases would be inappropriate for mediation, 
however. Public vindication might be particularly important for the accuser and 
the accused where the allegations resulted from a one on one encounter 
unobserved by witnesses.J04 In cases involving repeated or serial harassment, 
public litigation and liability could be essential to deter continued harassment. Jos 
Finally, mediation and other informal processes may disadvantage less powerful 
individuals, a concern for the harassed employee confronting the supervisor and 
the employer.J06 This latter argument will be discussed in more detail in Part 
11.H. 
While mediation may not be appropriate for all harassment cases, or indeed, 
in the view of some commentators, for any cases, it is not inconsistent with the 
law of sexual harassment. Although employers must take care to ensure that 
mediation is not utilized in a way that discourages use of the complaint 
procedure by reasonable employees,J07 offering the option may facilitate 
or other categories. 
300. Harkavy, supra note 299, at 157. A mediated settlement may avoid further 
victimization that might result from a deposition or trial testimony of the complainant, 
where the harasser's attorney attempts to discredit or blame her, or to explore her 
psychological history to dispute her claim of damages. Id. at 158. 
301. Id. at 157. 
302. Id. at 160. 
303. Id. at 160-61. 
304. Id. at 161, 162. 
305. Id. at 162, 163. Mediation of individual cases may allow resolution without 
a finding as to whether the harassment occurred, and thus may permit a harasser to 
continue the conduct without punishment. Kihnley, supra note 108, at 84-85. A serial 
harasser may avoid discipline based on repeat violations. Id. 
306. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. This argument applies not 
only to cases of sexual harassment but more broadly to mediation of all claims involving 
the generally less powerful employee and more powerful employer. But see Kate 
McCabe, A Forum for Women's Voices: Mediation Through a Feminist Jurisprudential 
lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv.459, 460 (2001 )(suggesting that mediation may offer a forum 
for women's voices to be heard). 
307. See supra note 295 and accompanying text. 
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resolution of some harassment cases to the satisfaction of all involved.308 The 
union or caucus representatives can assist employees in determining which 
disputes might be most appropriate for mediation, and when litigation is the more 
appropriate forum. 309 
G. Potential Conflicts of Interest and the Duty of Fair Representation 
One issue that may arise in a mediation procedure fornoncontractual claims 
is potential conflicts of interest for the union. As posited, the procedure would 
enable mediation of claims that bring employees into conflict with one another, 
or employees into conflict with the union. The conflict of interest issue is much 
more salient in the exclusive representation context, however. Once chosen by 
a majority, the union is the exclusive representative for all employees in the 
negotiation and administration of the collective bargaining agreement.310 The 
employees cannot separately negotiate with the employer, or settle grievances 
without the union. 311 The union must reconcile conflicting interests of 
308. An example of a situation where a cultural difference resulted in a dispute 
which was resolved by mediation was offered in an article about the REDRESS program. 
See Joseph P. Folger, Mediation Research: Studying Transformative Effects, 18 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 385, 395-96 (2001). A Hispanic employee was disciplined 
for leaving a meeting after his manager slammed a pile of papers on the table. Id. The 
employee complained that the action hurt his ears and filed a discrimination complaint. 
Id. The manager, angry at the suggestion that slamming papers could cause an injury so 
severe that the employee had to leave the building, relented when the employee explained 
the concept of"bad wind" from his culture, which he had been uncomfortable explaining 
earlier. Id. His discomfort in explaining the bad wind, which was like a curse on you 
and your family that you must escape, led him to claim that an injury caused him to leave, 
rather than the bad wind from the slamming of papers. Id. As described by Folger, the 
employee's revelation led to a lengthy discussion, apologies by the employee and the 
supervisor, and a withdrawal of the complaint. Id. 
309. Union representatives must make such recommendations based on objective 
nondiscriminatory criteria. See infra notes 310-41 and accompanying text. Unions and 
caucus representatives can also monitor the process to ensure that repeat offenders are 
not avoiding the consequences of harassment through sequential mediated settlements. 
See Kihnley, supra note 108, at 83-84; see also Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 
1604-05 (discussing a sexual harassment case at Mitsubishi, the role of the union, and 
the difficulties unions face in addressing issues of sexual harassment because of the 
gendered understanding of class). 
310. 29 u.s.c. § 159 (2000). 
311. Id. § l 59(a) (providing that employees can present grievances to the employer 
without union intervention so long as any settlement is not inconsistent with the 
collective bargaining agreement and the union is given notice and an opportunity to be 
present); Int') Bhd. ofElec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 46 n.8 (1979) (noting union's 
exclusive bargaining authority); Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 
U.S. 50, 73 (1975) (finding discharge of employees lawful where they sought to bypass 
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employees in deciding what to press for and what to settle for in negotiations, 
and which grievances to pursue and which to drop. For example, if an employee 
grieves denial of a promotion, the union must decide whether to support the 
grievance which, if successful, would obtain the promotion for one bargaining 
unit member at the expense of another who actually received the disputed 
promotion. The duty of fair representation guides the union in its decisions-the 
union must represent all employees in good faith, without arbitrary or 
discriminatory treatment.312 If the union violates its duty, it is liable to the 
employees.313 Thus, the union is regularly faced with decisions where it must 
reconcile the conflicting interests of employees. 
In one sense, the decisions are less difficult in the proposed mediation 
procedure. Because the employees have one or more alternatives to mediation, 
at least in the case of legal claims,314 any employee who believed that union 
conflict of interest would adversely affect the procedure could decline to 
participate. Also, an employee could avoid the union and choose alternative 
representation, such as an attorney or a community organization. The union's 
only role in such cases, assuming no claim against the union, would be to ensure 
that any settlement did not violate the collective bargaining agreement. 
Potential conflicts might arise, however, where the dispute involved two 
employees in the bargaining unit and both sought union representation. If one 
employee complained of harassment by another, for example, both might desire 
union representation. Employee identity caucuses, either formed as a part of 
union structure or outside it, provide the union with an option in such 
situations. 315 The caucuses, where encouraged by the union to take an active role 
in mediation, might have more power and influence than they would when 
the union and deal directly with the employer to address issues of race discrimination); 
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) (holding that an employer 
could not bargain directly with employees represented by union even where employees 
initiated bargaining). 
312. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int') v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 76-77 (1991); Vaca v. 
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). 
313. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 195-96. 
314. The employee could simply pursue the available legal remedy through the 
administrative agency or court. Alternatively, ifthe action also violated the contract, the 
employee could file a grievance, where the duty of fair representation would clearly 
constrain the union's action. The duty of fair representation may not apply to the 
mediation procedure. See infra notes 323-39 and accompanying text. 
315. To allow such representation and to encourage or allow organization of 
identity caucuses, the union must be open to recognizing the diversity of interests among 
its members. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1611. While the modest 
recommendation here does not go so far as Crain and Matheny in advocating elimination 
of the law requiring exclusive representation, id. at 1614-24, it does require a lessening 
of the union's grip on exclusive representation of the bargaining unit. 
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formed without union support.316 The most obvious role for caucuses formed 
along the lines of gender, race and ethnicity would be representing employees 
in disputes involving discrimination or benefits directly relevant to particular 
groups, such as childcare or parental leave, but there is no reason that a caucus 
could not represent an employee/member in other disputes as well.317 
While union and caucus representation of conflicting employee interests in 
mediation has the potential for exacerbating intra-union conflicts, mediation is 
a forum that provides opportunities for settling disputes and preserving 
relationships. There is no dearth of conflicting interests within the union 
membership in the absence of mediation. The union is simply charged, under 
traditional labor law, with reconciling those conflicting interests without 
discrimination or arbitrary treatment. Channeling those conflicts into mediation 
offers an alternative method for dealing with the conflicts, one perhaps better 
designed to resolve them. 
When conflicts of interest arise in the traditional labor law context, the 
union's actions are governed by the duty of fair representation. The duty of fair 
representation arises from the right of exclusive representation. Because the 
employee cannot escape the union's representation by dealing directly with the 
employer, the duty of fair representation is necessary to avoid constitutional 
issues, according to the Supreme Court's decision in Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Co. 318 The duty compels the union to represent the employee 
in good faith and without arbitrary or discriminatory treatment. 319 Thus a union's 
decision to represent one employee rather than another where their interests 
conflict will be tested against the requirements of the duty. For example, if an 
employee complains of harassment by another employee, who is then disciplined 
and files a grievance challenging that discipline under the collective bargaining 
agreement, the union must decide whether to pursue the grievance. If the 
union's decision is based on a good faith investigation and decision about the 
merits of the grievance, it will survive challenge, even if the decision is 
incorrect. 320 Even where there is no conflict of interest between members of the 
316. For discussions of the effectiveness of caucuses in particular situations, see 
Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-20 (arguing for multiple representatives and 
coalition building to strengthen both labor and nonlabor groups); and Yelnosky, supra 
note 117, at 615-17 (detailing some specific successes, but noting that results were 
mixed). Crain and Matheny, however, suggest that employees have the option of 
choosing separate nonmajority representatives, which would then be free to build 
coalitions among themselves. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-20. 
317. It would be essential for the caucuses to be free to advocate for the interests 
of the employees that they represent without fear of union discipline or reprisal. All 
employees would have to understand the role of the caucuses. 
318. 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). 
319. See supra note 312 and accompanying text. 
320. This does not mean, of course, that the employee whose interests are not 
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bargaining unit or a member of the bargaining unit and the union, the duty of fair 
representation applies to union actions relating to employee grievances as well 
as negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. 
In the absence of conflicts of interest, concerns about adequacy of union 
representation could still arise. However well-trained, union and caucus 
representatives would not have the equivalent of legal training and bar 
admission. Their advice to employees in mediation might miss important legal 
issues and influence employees to give up legal rights in settlement 
disproportionate to the strength of their claims.321 This concern-is mitigated by 
several facts. Many employees will be faced with the choice of union 
representation or no representation.322 In addition, not all lawyers will provide 
effective representation. While an experienced employment lawyer might be a 
better choice for a representative, a general practice attorney, however well-
intentioned, might give no better representation, and perhaps worse, than a 
trained union representative familiar with employment issues and the workplace. 
Thus, employees as a group may be better off with union representation, 
although it is possible that a few employees might be disadvantaged if they are 
unaware of the strength of their case and settle for less than possible. 323 As the 
procedure is contemplated, however, employees would have the option to get 
legal representation. Union representatives could be trained to identify cases 
where legal representation might benefit the employee and recommend retention 
of an attorney in such cases. The right to retain legal representation where 
desired will reduce, although not eliminate, the potential for employee 
disadvantage. 
One question that would certainly arise if the union and employer 
negotiated a voluntary mediation procedure for noncontractual claims is whether 
the duty of fair representation would apply. Application of the duty, or even 
uncertainty about its application, might discourage unions from adopting such 
procedures because it would create potential for liability where none existed. 
There would be a strong argument, based on the origins of the duty, that it does 
not apply to a procedure which is optional and allows participating employees 
to decline to participate or to select any representative of their choosing. The 
supported by the decision will be satisfied with the union's decision. 
321. See Ellyn Moscowitz & Victor J. Van Bourg, Carve-outs and the Privatization 
of Workers' Compensation in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1, 51-52 (1995) (raising concern that nonlawyer union representatives in workers' 
compensation cases may fail to apprise workers of possible third party claims). 
322. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
323. With respect to financial settlements, the recovery for employees with legal 
representation will be reduced by the amount required to pay the attorney. Thus, even 
if an employee without legal representation obtains less than the maximum potential 
settlement, the net amount might be equal. 
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purpose of the duty, ensuring fair representation where the employee cannot 
represent himself or herself, does not require its operation in this context. 
Analogous precedent supports the conclusion that the duty should not apply 
where the union does not have exclusive representation rights. Several lower 
courts have addressed the question of whether the duty applies in the context of 
judicial appeals from arbitration decisions.324 The most thoroughly reasoned, 
and the only appellate court decision, is the Seventh Circuit's opinion in 
Freeman v. Local Union No. J 35, Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers.325 The 
court concluded that there is no duty of fair representation where the "union does 
not serve as the exclusive agent for the members of the bargaining unit with 
respect to a particular rnatter."326 The court noted that where the union has an 
exclusive right to represent the employee, the duty of fair representation applies 
to protect the employee's rights, but where the individual is free to seek relief on 
his or her own, the union has no exclusive rights. 327 Thus, because the employee 
could file his own suit to vacate the arbitrator's award, the union owed him no 
duty to file such a suit.328 
Once the arbitrator denied plaintiffs grievance, the rationale for the 
duty of fair representation evaporated; Freeman no longer needed the 
protections provided by the duty of fair representation because he had 
access to extra-contractual remedies. That being the case, the union 
owed plaintiff no duty in deciding whether to seek judicial review of 
the committee's ruling because, with respect to that decision, it was 
not acting as his exclusive representative. The union was under no 
324. For other cases limiting the duty to contexts in which the union operates as 
exclusive representative, see Dycus v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 820, 826 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(affirming NLRB's finding that the duty does not apply to union's withdrawal as 
representative since duty terminates with representation); Merk v. Jewel Food Stores 
Div., 641 F. Supp. 1024, 1028-31 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(finding that a union owed no duty to former employees in settling wage claims with 
employer where they were no longer members of the bargaining unit and their interests 
conflicted with those of current employees); Lacy v. Local 287, No. IP77-672-C, 1979 
WL 2008, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 1979) (finding that a union owed plaintiffs no duty 
with respect to filing claim for Trade Readjustment Assistance benefits), ajf'd, 624 F.2d 
1106 (7th Cir. 1980); cf Roberts v. W. Airlines, 425 F. Supp. 416, 430-31 (N.D. Cal. 
1976) (finding that a union has no legal duty to file lawsuit challenging state Jaws 
limiting employment of women); and Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1229 
(C.D. Cal. 1968), ajf'd, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (same). 
325. 746 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1984). 
326. Id. at 1321. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. 
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duty to provide Freeman with more legal assistance than bargained for 
in the contract or required by law.329 
Additionally, the court reasoned that a decision that the duty of fair 
representation applied would cause more appeals of arbitrator's decisions, 
thereby undermining the finality of arbitral awards; this would be inconsistent 
with federal labor policy.330 
In the mediation procedure advocated here, the employees would have the 
right to file their own claims or to ignore the procedure altogether and go directly 
to the appropriate administrative agency or court. Thus, no duty of fair 
representation is necessary. While the union might owe the employees a duty 
with respect to negotiation of the procedure, 331 implementation of the procedure 
would be outside the scope of the duty. 
There are various arguments for distinguishing the cases finding no duty of 
fair representation, however. Most of the cases in which courts declined to find 
a duty involved employee attempts to evade the statute of limitations bar for 
filing their own claims. 332 In addition, the labor policy supporting the finality of 
arbitration militated in favor of finding no union duty to appeal unfavorable 
arbitration decisions. If the union negotiates a procedure in which it offers 
representation to at least some members of a bargaining unit, perhaps the duty 
329. Id. at 1321-22; see Steffens v. Bhd. of Ry. & Airline Clerks, 797 F.2d 442, 
447 (7th Cir. 1986); Searv. Cadillac Auto. Co. of Boston, 501 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (D. 
Mass. 1980), ajf'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d4, 7 (lst Cir. 198l)(decliningto find that 
failure to appeal could never breach the duty, but suggesting that that the courts should 
permit such actions "if at all, only in unusual instances where unfairness is blatant"). But 
see Local 1902 v. Safety Cabs, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 64, 66 (M.D. Fla. 1976)(implyingsuch 
a duty). 
330. Freeman, 746 F.2d at 1322. 
33 l. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'! v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 77 (1991). So long 
as the procedure is voluntary and open to all employees, there is little risk of a claim for 
breach of the duty related to negotiation of the procedure. While the union might make 
some concession to management to obtain the procedure, given the benefits for the 
employer, great sacrifice of employee benefits is unlikely to be necessary. In any event, 
the union has great flexibility in deciding what trade-offs to make in bargaining. Id. at 
78. 
332. See, e.g., Steffens, 797 F.2d at447; Freeman, 746 F.2d at 1322; Lacyv. Local 
287, No. IP77-672-C, 1979 WL 2008, at *12, aff'd, 624 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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of fair representation should apply.333 In its absence, what is to hold the union 
accountable to the employees that it represents? 
As a democratically elected representative of the employees, the union can 
be decertified if a majority of the employees are dissatisfied with its 
representation. Opportunities for decertification are limited, however, to 
petitions filed during a thirty day period every three years unless the union is 
unable to negotiate a replacement collective bargaining agreement, in which case 
a petition can be filed after contract expiration.334 Additionally, the Landrum-
Griffin Act requires regularly conducted elections for union officers, which 
provide an opportunity to replace unsatisfactory officers. 335 The threat ofloss of 
representation rights and loss of union office provides an incentive to union 
officials to represent employees fairly. The ability to remove the union or its 
officers, however, is little consolation to the employee who loses a job as a result 
of unfair representation. Discrimination law provides a potential cause of action 
for employees injured as a result of the union's discrimination on the basis of 
race, gender, religion, national origin, age or disability.336 This cause of action 
would not cover every instance of possible injury to employees, however. For 
example, a union official might pressure an employee to accept an unfavorable 
settlement in a strong case for improper but not discriminatory reasons, such as 
a promise of favorable treatment from the employer in another case more 
important to the union, or even a financial payment to the official. In a less 
egregious case, inadequate representation might lead an employee to a settlement 
later regretted. While such conduct might be rare, the absence of the constraints 
of the duty of fair representation might not discourage the temptation. 
Application of the duty, however, might discourage the union from creating a 
procedure that adds to its potential liability. 
333. For arguments for a broader union duty, see Crain & Matheny, supra note 2, 
at 1840-41 (urging imposition of an affirmative legal duty on unions to combat 
discrimination in the workplace); Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor 
Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX L. REV. l, 29 n.74 (1981) (arguing 
that the dutyoffairrepresentation should apply to any representational function the union 
performs, whether mandatory or voluntary). 
334. Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962). 
335. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 
519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)). 
336. 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (2000) (providing that it is unlawful for a labor 
organization to discriminate against any employee on the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2( c) (2000) (providing that it is unlawful for any labor organization to discriminate 
against an individual because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12111-12112 (2000) (providing that no covered entity shall discriminate against an 
individual with a disability and defining "covered entity" to include labor organizations). 
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Although the wide range of reasonableness accorded to the union under the 
duty of fair representation337 makes imposition of liability a relatively rare 
occurrence, the cost of defending even unsuccessful claims is not insubstantial. 
The concern about costs encourages unions to take great care in exercising their 
representational duties. One might argue that applying the duty of fair 
representation to a voluntary mediation procedure in the context of egregious 
union misconduct would be appropriate. On the other hand, the union should 
have the freedom to decide how best to deploy its limited resources. For 
example, the union should be able to choose to represent some employees, but 
not all, in mediation procedures, without fear of lawsuits for breach of the fair 
representation duty. In addition, the union must be able to advocate for the 
interests of the bargaining unit by either resisting settlements that violate the 
collective bargaining agreement or agreeing to modify the agreement where 
deemed appropriate, without fear of legal challenge. The duty of fair 
representation, with its wide range of reasonableness, may be a better standard 
for evaluating union conduct in mediation than other possible claims such as 
negligence in the performance of a duty or legal malpractice, which would be 
preempted by the duty of fair representation where it applies.338 
While there is no certainty that unions would escape liability for any action 
taken in the procedure advocated here, ultimately, if unions are to flourish again, 
they must find a way to appeal to a broader sector of employees and to overcome 
the employees' fear of selecting union representation. Although negotiation of 
a mediation procedure may bring with it some risk ofliability, either through the 
duty of fair representation, discrimination law or other legal action, unions must 
take some risk in order to grow. The potential benefits for members and the 
union may outweigh the liability risk of this voluntary procedure. 339 Indeed, the 
mediation procedure might provide a vehicle for resolution of duty of fair 
representation or other claims filed against the union.340 Mediation might save 
337. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'! v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991). 
338. See United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 371 (1990); Moscowitz 
& Van Bourg, supra note 321, at 51-52 (discussing cases where plaintiffs failed in efforts 
to hold nonlawyer union representatives liable for legal malpractice). 
339. It is worth noting that postal employees reported high levels of satisfaction 
with the fairness of a similar mediation process, whether they were represented by the 
union, by another representative or had no representation. See supra notes 181-84 and 
accompanying text. Thus the likelihood of claims against the union might be small. 
Notably, in the coal industry grievance mediation study no duty of fair representation 
suits were initiated by employees whose grievances were not arbitrated after mediation. 
Elkiss, supra note 90, at 679. 
340. Mediation could be a step in the union's procedure for employees' internal 
appeals from union decisions not to pursue grievances. While such a procedure is 
typically a part of the union's constitution and bylaws, the union cannot require 
exhaustion of such a procedure prior to a lawsuit for duty of fair representation unless the 
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the union legal costs in defending such claims and ultimately result in employees 
gaining a better understanding of the union's decisions and the constraints upon 
those decision and the union's resources.341 
The mediation procedure might provide a defense in cases seeking to hold 
the union liable for hostile environment sexual harassment as well. 342 As noted 
above, the Supreme Court has held that an employer can avoid vicarious liability 
for supervisory sexual harassment if it can establish that it "exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and ... 
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
appeals procedure can provide complete relief to the employee. See Clayton v. Int'l 
Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 692 (1981 ). In order to provide for such relief, the union 
would need to negotiate an agreement with the employer to allow reactivation of 
grievances or otherwise to enable complete relief if agreed to in a mediated settlement. 
341. As in all cases, the employee must be free to choose any representative 
desired. The potential conflict of interest in union representation is quite clear here. 
342. Unions may be liable for harassment under Title VII if the union officials 
actively engage in harassment or ifthe union deliberately acquiesces in an employer's 
harassment. See, e.g., Agosto v. Correctional Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 107 F. Supp. 
2d 294, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying motion for summary judgment based on 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the union not only failed to assist plaintiff 
in her complaints about harassment but also participated in creating the hostile work 
environment); Raineyv. Town of Warren, 80 F. Supp. 2d5, 18-19(D.R.I. 2000)(denying 
union's motion for summary judgment based on genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the union deliberately acquiesced in the employer's harassment by failing to file 
grievances despite knowledge of the severe and ongoing harassment); EEOC v. Regency 
Architectural Metals Corp., 896 F. Supp. 260, 269 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding union liable 
for intentionally failing to pursue female employee's hostile environment complaint to 
cater to the prejudices of the majority of the union's membership), aff'd sub nom., EEOC 
v. Shopmen's Local 832, No. 96-6039, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9570 (2d Cir. Apr. 29, 
1997); Stairv. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, No. 91-1507, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8668, at •80-81 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 1993) (finding union liable for sexual 
harassment where it distributed pornographic calendars with the union's name, address 
and logo to members and employers, who posted them in the work sites), aff d, 43 F.3d 
1463 (3d Cir. 1994). The union may also be liable for breaching the duty of fair 
representation where it intentionally fails to pursue harassment grievances. See Woods 
v. Graphic Communications Union Local 747, 925 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding 
union liable for breach of duty of fair representation for deliberately refusing to pursue 
racial harassment grievances). State anti-discrimination Jaw may impose an even higher 
duty on the union. See Epstein v. Sonoma County Org. of Public/Private Employees, No. 
C-90-3514, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6216, at •12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1992) (denying 
union's summary judgment motion because there was a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether the union violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which 
placed an affirmative duty on unions "to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent 
discrimination and harassment from occurring"). 
434 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
otherwise."343 The primary method of meeting this defense is the existence of 
an effective complaint procedure that the employee unreasonably fails to 
utilize.344 A strong union policy against harassment, combined with a mediation 
procedure for disputes between employees and the union which allows 
employees to choose their own representative, may meet the first prong of the 
defense. The presence of active and effective caucuses for minority groups 
within the union may further help to convince courts that the procedure is 
sufficiently effective that an employee who fails to utilize the procedure is acting 
unreasonably. If the procedure operates to limit harassment lawsuits against the 
union, the union will obtain both financial and reputational benefits. 
H. Issues of Power 
Issues of power predominate in the workplace and the law of the workplace. 
The National Labor Relations Act was designed to allow employees to combine 
their power to better combat the power of employers.345 Unions do provide a 
counterweight to employer power, but even in their heyday unions did not 
eliminate power imbalances between workers and employers.346 Today, when 
unions represent 13.5 percent of the nonagricultural workforce, their power is 
greatly diminished. Employees without unique skills are even less powerful, 
particularly in slack labor markets. And, as a general rule, white female 
employees and employees of color have even less power. 
Critics of ADR in general suggest that individuals with less power are better 
off in the court system, with its due process protections and formal mechanisms 
for equal treatment oflitigants, than in more informal systems like mediation. 347 
343. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). Several courts have 
suggested that the same principles of assessing liability for the actions of officials should 
apply to the employer and the union. See Woods, 925 F.2d at 1201;Agosto, 107 F. Supp. 
2d at 307-08. • 
344. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
345. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (2000). 
346. This is not to suggest that in a given situation a union, or even an individual 
employee, may not have more power than an employer, but such situations are 
uncommon. 
347. See Richard Abel, Jnformalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 375, 383 (1985); Delgado et al., supra note 39, at 1398-99; 
William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REV. 384, 385 (1985). This argument would not apply to mediation systems that do not 
include legal claims. However, one of the incentives for the employer to agree to such 
a system is the potential cost savings resulting from settlement of legal claims. An 
employer is less likely to create a system that incorporates only noncontractual, nonlegal 
disputes unless it is convinced that mediation of such disputes will substantially raise 
morale and productivity, as it gives employees a forum for claims where none previously 
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If this is true, mediation may disadvantage more employees than it helps. Critics 
suggest that formal mechanisms reduce the chance that bias will affect the legal 
process.348 
One answer to this concern is that the suggested procedure is optional. 
Employees who view the court system as a better option can decline mediation. 
Some employees, however, may be convinced by the employer to participate in 
mediation to their detriment. Free representation by unions, caucuses or 
community groups will help balance power in mediation. Caucus representatives 
and social justice organizations should be particularly sensitive to bias issues and 
can help control bias in mediation. Attorney representation can also add balance, 
albeit at a substantial cost. The training and experience of these representatives 
diminishes the possibility that the employee will be disadvantaged. Moreover, 
the legal system is no panacea. If the employee cannot afford effective legal 
representation, any benefit from the legal system is limited, if not nonexistent. 349 
existed with little corresponding benefit to the employer. 
348. Delgado et al., supra note 39, at 1398-99; Grillo, supra note 40, at 1588-90. 
Additionally, there is some evidence that mediation is more likely to result in agreement 
when the parties are ofrelatively equal power. See Kenneth Kresse) & Dean G. Pruitt, 
Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the Mediation of Social Conflict, in MEDIATION 
RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OFTHIRD-P ARTY INTERVENTION 394, 404-
05 (Kenneth Kresse) et al. eds., 1989). A study of six hundred cases in small claims court 
in New Mexico evaluated outcomes of cases assigned randomly to mediation and 
adjudication. The results revealed that women fared better in mediation than in 
adjudication, although their subjective evaluation of mediation was more negative than 
their evaluation of adjudication. Minorities, who were predominantly Hispanic, fared 
worse in mediation than in adjudication and also fared worse in mediation than whites. 
The differences in mediation outcomes disappeared when both mediators were mediators 
of color, however. Despite their objective monetary disadvantage, minority disputants 
were more enthusiastic about mediation than white disputants. James Alfini et al., What 
Happens When Mediation Is Institutionalized?: To the Parties, Practitioners, and Host 
Institutions, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 307, 316-17 (1994) (comments of Michele 
Hermann). One explanation of these differences may be that the parties are more 
interested in process than outcome. Id. at 322 (comments of Robert Baruch Bush). It is 
possible that parties may be both empowered and disadvantaged by mediation. A party 
may be empowered (or feel empowered) by the process, yet objectively receive less relief 
than he or she would have received in litigation. Hodges, supra note I 08, at 462 n.185. 
Definitions of empowerment may vary as well. Craig A. McEwen, Note on Mediation 
Research, in DISPUTE REsOLUTION 155, 156 (Stephen B. Goldberg et al. eds., 2d ed. 
1992). In one view empowerment may come only from legal advocacy, while in another 
it may come from more direct involvement in the dispute and its resolution. Id. 
349. SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 
AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING, at ix ( 1990) (noting in her preface that "the 
ability to retain and compensate an attorney is, effectively, a prerequisite to participation 
in judicial decision making"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: 
Access to Justice in the United States, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y I, 2 (2001) ("It remains 
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Simply put, power imbalances will always affect resolution of disputes in the 
workplace. At best, their role can be minimized. 
Another power concern is that the more powerful employer might use the 
mediation process solely for the purpose of obtaining discovery for later 
litigation. 350 The employee, of course, could also use mediation for this purpose. 
There is widespread agreement that confidentiality is crucial for mediation to be 
successful, particularly where legal claims are involved that may be (or are) the 
subject of litigation.351 Preserving confidentiality, and the perception of 
confidentiality, is an issue for every mediation procedure. Trained and 
experienced mediators are well aware of the importance of confidentiality and 
careful mediator selection will help alleviate this concern. The mediator's 
selective use of caucuses during the mediation procedure will assist in 
maintenance of confidentiality as well. State and federal laws control 
confidentiality in court proceedings and while the results are not always 
predictable, as mediation grows predictability will grow as well. 352 Additionally 
true, however, that the poor, and even the middle class, encounter financial impediments 
to a day in court. They do not enjoy the secure access available to those with full purses 
or political muscle."); Robert A. Katzmann, Themes in Context, in THE LAW FIRM AND 
THE PUBLIC GOOD 2 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1995) (noting that the legal needs of the 
poor are often unmet); Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The 
Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49 Mo. L. REV. 78, 86 (1990) (noting that several 
studies have demonstrated the extent to which the legal needs of the poor are unmet); 
Monica L. Warmbrod, Comment, Could an Attorney Face Disciplinary Actions or Even 
Legal Malpractice Liability for Failure to Inform Clients of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution?, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 791, 800 n.76, 801 (1996-97) (noting that parties with 
fewer economic resources do not face a "level playing field" in the courtroom); see also 
sources cited supra note 48 (discussing various studies demonstrating that representation 
increases odds of prevailing in unemployment compensation and arbitration 
proceedings). 
350. Harkavy, supra note 299, at 162. 
351. Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal 
System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 239, 243-45 (2002) [hereinafter Deason, 
Predictable Mediation]. The Uniform Mediation Act, which was recently adopted by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the ABA House of 
Delegates, contains significant confidentiality protections. Ellen E. Deason, Uniform 
Mediation Act: Law Ensures Confidentiality, Neutrality of Process, 8 DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Summer 2002, at 7. The Act has been adopted in Nebraska and introduced into 
other state legislatures, but not yet adopted. See http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pubndra 
fts.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). The Act is available online at http://www.law.upenn. 
edu/bll/ulc/mediat/UMA2001.htrn (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). 
352. For a thorough discussion of confidentiality issues, see Deason, Predictable 
Mediation, supra note 351, and Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation 
Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79 
(2001). 
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the parties can craft confidentiality rules in negotiating the procedure, improving 
predictability and controlling disclosure.353 
It has been suggested that confidentiality is of particular concern in 
mediation programs in unionized environments because of the union's statutory 
right to be present at the settlement of grievances.354 The statutory right is 
subject to waiver, however.355 Further, the right may apply only to contractual 
grievances, not to individual legal disputes outside the collective bargaining 
agreement.356 Nevertheless, both the union and the employer have an interest in 
ensuring that settlements do not conflict with the collective bargaining 
agreement.357 To preserve both this interest and the benefits of mediation, the 
parties must structure the mediation system so that employees can choose their 
own representatives, eschewing union participation if they so desire, while 
retaining the union's right to review settlements that may conflict with the 
collective bargaining agreement. While confidentiality is an important aspect of 
mediation, union involvement in settlements that necessitate changes in the 
collective bargaining agreement will enhance the parties' ability to deal with 
structural discrimination issues.358 Thus, the system must be negotiated to 
balance these interests to better serve all parties and accomplish the goals of the 
program. 
I. Statute of Limitations Issues for Legal Claims 
Finally, any mediation program covering legal claims must address the 
statute oflirnitations. The most common legal issues arising out of employment, 
such as discrimination claims, have a relatively short statute of limitations. For 
example, under Title VII, an employee must file a charge with the EEOC within 
353. Deason, Predictable Mediation, supra note 351, at 303-08; Goldberg & Brett, 
supra note 91, at 24-25 (describing grievance mediation procedure which precludes use 
of anything done or said at mediation in subsequent arbitration of the dispute). 
354. Stacia Marie Jones, Note & Comment, Confidentiality in 
Discrimination-Related Dispute Mediation: Is There a Congressional Mandate for 
Union Employees to Have an Individual Right to Pursue Mediation Without Union 
Representation?, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 483, 487-88 (2000) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(a) (2000)). 
355. See Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Div., 89 N.L.R.B. 341, 345 (1950). 
356. See U.S. Postal Serv., 281 N.L.R.B. 1015, 1018 (1986) (finding that union 
had right to be present at settlement of EEO disputes where the employees had also filed 
contractual grievances over the same issue, but making no finding about the right to be 
present at meetings relating to EEO disputes where no overlapping contractual grievance 
was filed). 
357. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
358. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
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180 or three hundred days of the occurrence of the unlawful conduct. 359 
Mediation must not cause the employee to lose a claim for failure to file a timely 
charge or lawsuit. At the same time, some of the advantage of mediation would 
be lost if the parties had to participate in formal agency or court proceedings 
pending mediation.360 In negotiation and implementation of the procedure, the 
employer and the union must be aware of statutes of limitations. Generally, the 
statute of limitations is not tolled during use of an internal dispute resolution 
program.361 The employer and the union could agree, as part of the program, 
however, to waive the statute oflimitations defense for mediated claims. 362 Such 
an agreement will be effective where compliance with the statute oflimitations 
is not a jurisdictional bar.363 An alternative is to file the claim and ask the court 
or agency to delay investigation or litigation pending mediation. This alternative 
depends on the agreement of nonparties, which may not always be forthcoming. 
Regardless of which alternative is chosen, union and caucus representatives, as 
well as employees, must be educated about the statutes oflimitations for various 
claims to avoid loss of claims for failure to make a timely filing. In addition, the 
mediation program should be designed to ensure prompt mediation of claims. 
Failure to do so eliminates some major advantages of an ADR program. 
J. Summary 
A mediation program negotiated in accordance with the principles set forth 
here offers potential to resolve noncontractual disputes in the unionized 
workplace. Employers and employees will benefit. In addition, the procedure 
359. See Nat') R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002). 
360. In some cases, mediation of a legal claim might be more successful after some 
discovery of the facts as each party would have a better sense of the viability of the claim. 
See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 57-58 (2d ed. 1986). Quick 
settlement before positions harden and relationships are more seriously disrupted, 
however, also has its advantages. 
36 l. See Int') Union ofEJec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236 
(I 976). The exception is when an employer fraudulently induces a plaintiff not to file 
a claim. See, e.g., Sharp v. United Air Lines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 372-73 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Lever v. Northwestern Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1992). 
362. See Supinski v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. OOCV7363, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11953, at* 7-8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2001) (finding that Merrill Lynch agreed in its 
dispute resolution program to tolling of the statute oflimitations so long as the employee 
filed a claim for mediation within the statute of limitations). To avoid the problems of 
faded memories and lost witnesses that the statute oflimitations is designed to address, 
the program, like the Merrill Lynch program, could require filing a request for mediation 
prior to the expiration of the statute oflimitations. 
363. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (finding 
that filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC under Title VII is not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite for a lawsuit but rather is subject to waiver, estoppel and tolling). 
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provides an opportunity for the union to actively engage individual members 
who have traditionally been considered outsiders. Mediation also offers an 
additional avenue for cooperation between unions and social justice 
organizations. Mediation, done right, can be a step on the road to union 
revitalization. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
Transformation of the system of American industrial relations and 
revitalization of labor unions or other organizations for employee voice in the 
workplace will be a lengthy process, characterized by progression and 
regression. The academic debate has contributed much valuable insight into the 
possibilities for such transformation. A mediation program for the 
noncontractual claims of unionized employees could provide a mechanism for 
effective employee voice, while at the same time providing sufficient benefits to 
employers to make the program an attractive option. Experiments with such 
mediation could reveal whether the projected benefits become a reality. Unions 
and employers should begin such experimentation. Small steps may lead to more 
substantial changes which make the system of industrial relations more 
responsive to the realities of today's workplace, better serving the needs of both 
employers and employees. 
